SEX AND THE STATEHOUSE:
The Effects of Women's Political Recruitment Organizations on Gender Ratios in State Legislatures

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by
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Abstract: State-level women's political recruitment organizations have worked to increase female representation in state elective offices for decades, but the effectiveness of their efforts have not been examined empirically. This thesis aims to fill that void by creating and analyzing an original dataset describing the characteristics and activities of women's political recruitment organizations over time. Using data from 49 states across the years 1973-2003, this study performs multiple time series regression analyses and finds that women's organizations have had a positive, statistically significant effect on the percentage of state representative seats held by women. Further analysis differentiating by party, however, reveals that the effects of women's organizations are significant only for Democratic women, and are insignificant for Republican women.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1- Preamble

In 1893 Colorado granted women the right to vote. One year later, men and women voters elected Carrie Clyde Holly, Clara Cressingham, and Frances S. Klock to the Colorado House of Representatives, making them the nation's first female legislators. Two years later, Utah elected the first woman state senator, Martha Hughes Cannon. In 1917, three years before women gained the right to vote nationally, Jeanette Rankin of Montana became the first woman elected to the U.S. House of Representatives. Hattie Wyatt Caraway of Arkansas became the first woman to enter the U.S. Senate when she was appointed to fill her late husband's seat in 1931. She was subsequently elected to two more terms. By 1936, every state had elected at least one woman to its legislature.

Yet, these early women politicians were few and far between. By 1970, the average percentage of legislative seats held by women was still less than 10% across all states. It wasn't until the 1970s that the first women were elected to governorships and to the U.S. Senate in their own right. (All previous women had either succeeded their late husbands or were appointed to an unexpired term).

The paucity of women in elected office did not go unnoticed by the budding women's movement. The demands for greater workplace equality, reproductive freedom, and civil rights protections were accompanied by the recognition that more women were needed in positions of governmental power. In 1971, 320 women from 26 states convened in Washington, D.C. to found the National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC) and its many state chapters. Three years later, the Women's Campaign Fund was founded to give financial support to progressive female candidates at all levels of government. After the celebrated success of EMILY's List in the late 1980s and early 90s, a number of similarly-structured women's political action committees (PACs) sprang up at the state level to help state and local women candidates the way EMILY's List helped Congressional candidates.

The efficacy of these organizations in getting women elected to office has not been studied thoroughly, particularly at the state level. This thesis has two purposes. First, I present an overview of the efforts that women's political recruitment organizations in the United States have made to increase women's participation in politics. Second, I empirically test the hypothesis that these organizations positively affect the number of women serving in elected office, as measured specifically by the percentage of seats held by women in state houses of representatives. The statistical analysis uses a fixed effects regression model with data on 49 states from 1973 to 2003. To estimate this model, I constructed a new data series on the history of women's political recruitment organizations in each of the states by conducting archival research and over 100 interviews. The

principal finding of this thesis is that state-level women's political recruitment organizations have had a positive and statistically significant effect on the percentage of lower-house seats held by women. After analyzing the data along party lines, however, I find that the effects are only significant for Democratic women, and are insignificant for Republican women.[1]

1.2- Why Women?

Some may wonder why it is important to have more women in government. Is there anything inherently wrong with having a government run overwhelmingly by men? In theory, the gender of an individual elected representative should not matter, as long as he or she adequately serves the interests of his or her constituency. In practice, however, there are many reasons greater gender parity in government enhances the goals of democracy and our society.

Currently, women remain an under-tapped resource of talented leaders. The under-representation of women in government deprives society of many qualified leaders not only in the present, but in the future. When women are scarce in prominent positions of power, young women can get the message that politics is not a likely or desirable career option. Society and government cannot be said to be functioning efficiently if so many gifted individuals aren't living up to their potential.

[1] This study analyzes only women from the two major parties, as the number of third party and independent women that have been elected to state legislatures is extremely small.

Though there has been progress in breaking down the rigid gender roles of the past, we are still a society that emphasizes difference. Men and women grow up with different experiences, which inevitably shape the way they participate in politics. Much attention has been paid to the "gender gap" among voters, but this term may also apply to the elected representatives themselves. Women of either party tend to be more liberal than their male fellow partisans, and are much more likely to work on legislation that concerns women. (Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Carey, Niemi, and Powell 1998; Swers and Caiazza 2000) Women, it seems, are more inclined to communicate and advocate the interests of women than men are.

Women legislators who become committee leaders and ranking partisans also exhibit different leadership styles than male legislative leaders, emphasizing consensus building and cooperation rather than combativeness and individual control. (Whicker and Jewell, 1998) These differences in leadership styles and policy emphases indicate that the gender of a legislator does matter, and that the way the government is currently operating does not reflect the will of the population at large. As half the population, women deserve an equal say in the direction of the country.

1.3- Why Recruitment?

As Chapter 2 explains in detail, women do not suffer from a disadvantage with the electorate; that is, when women run for office, they have an equal chance of winning. The real problem is that few women choose to enter politics in the

first place. Women are less politically engaged, less confident of their qualifications, and less likely to consider a run for office than men. (Fox and Lawless 2004) Organizations aiming to get more women elected have the formidable task of finding capable women and encouraging them to choose politics as a career. Moreover, these efforts must be sustained; as women retire or move on to higher office, more women must be found to take their place at the beginning of the political pipeline.

Ideally, the study of women's recruitment into politics would focus on the local level, where most career politicians get their start. Getting new blood into the pipeline really means getting more women started in local politics who have not otherwise been involved before. Though most of the organizations studied in this thesis operate on a statewide basis, they commonly emphasize aiding local candidates in addition to those running for higher office.

Unfortunately, studying local-level politics is a daunting prospect, because the sheer number of municipalities and counties make data collection very difficult. There is no source of pooled, longitudinal data for the myriad local governments in the United States.

1.4- Why State Legislatures?

State legislatures, and most especially their lower houses, provide an ideal combination of proximity to the entry level, standardization of structure, and accessibility of information. Many legislators have held some type of position in local government prior to serving in the legislature. For statistical research, the

legislature is a suitable (if somewhat delayed) proxy for the entry level. And though legislatures come in various sizes and configurations, many differences can be controlled for in statistical models. On a more practical level, data concerning state legislatures are relatively easy to procure.

The state legislative level is also of interest to those studying higher levels of government. Many government officials at the state and federal level spent a portion of their early careers as state legislators. Women in Congress are now more likely than men to have previously served in lower office. (Cooperman 2001) No longer are women entering Congress "over his dead body," via succession or appointment. Female politicians who make a career of public office can have a long and influential effect on public issues. The key for women's political recruitment organizations is to increase the number of women on this career track.

1.5– Organization of the Chapters in this Thesis

In the following chapters, I will show that these organizations have had a positive impact on the number of women in state legislatures, though the effects vary by party. The heart of this thesis is an empirical test of the efficacy of women's political recruitment organizations on gender ratios in state legislatures. Before describing the statistical analyses, I review prior studies concerning women and politics in Chapter 2. Though female candidates are as successful electorally as similarly situated male candidates, women on the whole are much less likely to consider running in the first place. Many factors have been found to

correlate with higher or lower female legislative representation, falling into three rough categories: eligibility-pool related factors, sociopolitical factors, and institutional barriers. There is only scant research, however, on the efforts women's organizations have made to increase female representation.

Chapter 3 reviews the process by which I collected data on women's organizations across the states. Through archive research and networking, I developed a list of state-level women's organizations that have operated during the last three decades. I conducted interviews with the leaders of these organizations and developed a dataset to be used in longitudinal analysis. Chapter 4 presents the methodology of the study, including the structure of the statistical models and the process by which all dependent, independent, and control variables were coded. Chapter 5 presents the results of the statistical models. I find that women's organizations do have a positive, statistically significant effect on female representation in state houses, but this effect appears to be limited to Democratic women. Chapter 6 interprets the results and draws conclusions about the different roles women's organizations can play in getting women elected.

Chapter 2

Review of Literature

The first part of this chapter summarizes the historical trends in female representation in state legislatures. Though there are far more women legislators today than thirty years ago, women remain underrepresented. The latter parts of this chapter provide an overview of previous studies that have attempted to explain the variation in female legislative representation across the states.

2.1- Brief History of Women in State Legislatures

The number of women legislators remained minimal for decades after Coloradans elected the first three female representatives in 1893. By the 1970s, the national average was still in single digits, and the female legislative percentage (FLP) of many states remained close to zero. Table 1 tracks the progress of FLP in the 50 states since 1975.

TABLE 2.11 – Percentage Women in State Legislatures, 1975-2005

	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005
Alabama	0.7%	2.9%	6.4%	5.7%	3.6%	7.9%	10.0%
Alaska	15.0%	11.7%	18.3%	20.0%	23.3%	18.3%	18.3%
Arizona	20.0%	18.9%	20.0%	30.0%	30.0%	35.6%	33.3%
Arkansas	2.2%	3.0%	7.4%	7.4%	12.6%	15.6%	16.3%
California	2.5%	9.2%	12.5%	15.8%	20.8%	25.8%	30.8%
Colorado	16.0%	21.0%	24.0%	29.0%	31.0%	34.0%	33.0%
Connecticut	13.9%	19.8%	21.9%	21.9%	26.7%	29.9%	28.9%
Delaware	16.1%	11.3%	16.1%	16.1%	21.0%	24.2%	33.9%
Florida	8.1%	11.3%	19.4%	16.3%	19.4%	24.4%	23.8%
Georgia	4.2%	6.4%	9.7%	10.2%	18.2%	19.5%	18.2%
Hawaii	13.2%	13.2%	18.4%	23.7%	19.7%	22.4%	27.6%
Idaho	9.5%	9.5%	19.0%	24.6%	27.6%	25.7%	27.6%
Illinois	5.9%	11.0%	16.9%	18.6%	23.2%	24.9%	28.2%
Indiana	6.0%	7.3%	12.7%	14.0%	22.0%	18.0%	16.7%
Iowa	9.3%	10.0%	14.7%	16.7%	18.0%	20.7%	20.0%
Kansas	5.5%	8.5%	18.2%	25.5%	27.9%	32.7%	32.7%
Kentucky	3.6%	6.5%	6.5%	5.8%	8.0%	11.6%	12.3%
Louisiana	1.4%	1.4%	3.5%	2.1%	9.7%	16.0%	16.0%
Maine	13.0%	18.5%	23.7%	31.2%	25.8%	28.0%	23.7%
Maryland	10.1%	14.9%	19.1%	22.9%	28.7%	29.3%	34.0%
Massachusetts	8.0%	7.5%	16.5%	17.0%	24.0%	26.0%	24.5%
Michigan	6.1%	8.1%	10.8%	14.9%	22.3%	24.3%	20.3%
Minnesota	4.0%	9.0%	14.4%	18.4%	24.9%	28.4%	29.9%
Mississippi	3.4%	1.1%	2.3%	5.7%	11.5%	12.6%	12.6%
Missouri	6.1%	8.6%	13.2%	14.7%	19.8%	22.3%	21.3%
Montana	9.3%	9.3%	14.7%	18.0%	24.0%	24.7%	24.7%
Nebraska	2.0%	6.1%	16.3%	20.4%	24.5%	24.5%	24.5%
Nevada	11.7%	8.3%	15.9%	22.2%	34.9%	34.9%	33.3%
New Hampshire	24.5%	26.9%	33.0%	32.1%	29.7%	31.8%	30.7%
New Jersey	7.5%	10.0%	10.0%	10.8%	13.3%	15.8%	15.8%
New Mexico	4.5%	4.5%	11.6%	13.4%	20.5%	27.7%	31.3%
New York	4.3%	6.2%	11.4%	10.9%	18.0%	21.3%	23.6%
North Carolina	8.8%	12.9%	11.8%	14.1%	16.5%	18.2%	22.9%
North Dakota	10.7%	13.3%	11.3%	15.1%	15.0%	17.7%	16.3%
Ohio	6.1%	6.8%	9.1%	12.9%	24.2%	20.5%	19.7%
Oklahoma	4.0%	4.0%	8.7%	8.7%	10.7%	10.1%	14.8%
Oregon	12.2%	14.4%	20.0%	20.0%	28.9%	30.0%	28.9%
Pennsylvania	3.6%	4.3%	5.1%	6.7%	11.9%	12.6%	12.6%
Rhode Island	6.0%	8.7%	15.3%	15.3%	24.0%	24.7%	16.8%
South Carolina	4.1%	5.3%	5.9%	8.8%	12.4%	10.6%	8.8%
South Dakota	10.5%	8.6%	14.3%	19.0%	18.1%	14.3%	16.2%
Tennessee	3.8%	3.0%	8.3%	9.8%	13.6%	17.4%	17.4%
Texas	4.4%	6.6%	8.8%	10.5%	18.2%	18.2%	19.9%
Utah	7.7%	3.8%	6.7%	11.5%	14.4%	21.2%	20.2%
Vermont	12.2%	18.9%	26.1%	33.3%	30.0%	31.7%	33.3%
Virginia	4.3%	6.4%	7.9%	10.7%	11.4%	16.4%	14.3%
Washington	12.2%	18.4%	23.8%	29.3%	39.5%	40.8%	33.3%
West Virginia	6.7%	6.7%	17.2%	19.4%	14.9%	17.9%	15.7%
Wisconsin	7.6%	9.8%	18.9%	25.8%	24.2%	23.5%	25.8%
Wyoming	7.6%	17.4%	25.5%	23.4%	21.1%	18.9%	14.4%
AVERAGE	8.0%	9.8%	14.5%	17.0%	20.7%	22.5%	22.5%

SOURCE: Center for American Women and Politics fact sheets, http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/Facts4.html.

Certain states, such as New Hampshire and Arizona, were early leaders in FLP but did not gain at great rates. Others, including many Western states, gained rapidly in the 1970s to become today's leaders. Still other states, particularly those in the South, have made little progress relative to the rest of the country. Alabama and South Carolina, for instance, have only crossed into double digits in recent years. Figure 2.12 displays the progress of four states (Alabama, Michigan, New Hampshire, and Washington) and the national average; the chart shows the wide variation in states' progress over time.

Figure 2.12



The nationwide FLP average increased steadily throughout the 1970s and 80s, but as Table 2.12 shows, progress has started to level off in recent years. Many states, particularly those that made the greatest gains in the 1980s and 90s, have actually seen their FLP decrease. Washington, which became the first and only state to crack the 40% mark in the 1990s, has since fallen to 33%. In a

particularly extreme case, Wyoming went from 25.5% in 1985 (the third highest FLP in the nation at the time) to 14.4% today for a ranking of 44th in the nation. States such as Alabama and Oklahoma continue to be ranked at the bottom of the heap, but have been making modest gains that buoy the national FLP average and prevent it from actually decreasing. Figure 2.13 shows the top- and bottom-ranking FLP scores from 1975-2005, and demonstrate this narrowing of the spectrum of female representation across the states.

Figure 2.13



In recent years, the top-ranking FLP score has dropped from the low 40s to the low 30s, while the bottom-ranked score continues to rise. Because of this phenomenon, the national FLP average has stagnated and not decreased. If the top-ranked states continue to fall precipitously, though, the national FLP average will begin to descend.

2.2- Early Research

The amount of research on women in state legislatures has grown with the number of women elected. Emmy Werner (1968) was the first researcher to focus on the characteristics and correlates of women legislators across the states. She noted that states with small populations, particularly those in New England and the West, had the best records of electing women legislators, and that women were much more likely to be members of the minority party. Werner also surveyed women legislators about their backgrounds and political interests. She found that women legislators were usually married with children, that many had served in local governments and party organizations before entering the legislature, and that their interests were most often centered on issues of social welfare, including education and family life.

Since Werner's early study, many other researchers have sought explanations for the variation in female representation across the states. Their explanations have coalesced into three general theories. The first theory focuses on the eligibility pool of potential women candidates, and assumes that a more educated, professional, and politicized female populace will tend to produce more qualified women candidates. The second theory focuses on the role of socialization and gender roles on women's participation (or lack thereof) in the political arena. The third theory focuses on the institutional factors that impede or promote women's entry in to politics, which can include party elites, electoral structures, and competition for seats.

These explanations, however, must be taken in the context of the actual electoral successes and failures of women candidates. As the following section shows, there is strong evidence that when women run for office, they do as well as similarly situated male candidates.

2.3– Women's Electoral Success

A common myth, and one that many women themselves believe, is that women do not succeed electorally because some portion of the voting populace is sexist and will not vote for a woman. Some studies of elections in the 1960s and 70s showed that in certain states, women did, in fact, face an electorate that was biased against them. Women in these states had lower success rates than men, even when controlling for their lack of incumbency. (See Ambrosius and Welch 1984 for Nebraska, Iowa, and Missouri; Fowlkes 1984 for Georgia; Clark and Clark 1984 for New Mexico). These findings also supported those who believed in a "male conspiracy" theory, which stated that male party elites deliberately ignored promising female candidates, or allowed them to run only as "sacrificial lambs" in hopeless races.[2]

Other researchers, however, found that women did as well as men after controlling for party and incumbency status. (Diamond 1977; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Newman 1994) Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton (1997) present a particularly clear analysis of success rates for state legislature candidates, using

[2] Gertzog and Simard (1981) found evidence for this explanation at the Congressional level in a study of Congressional elections between 1916 and 1978. Women candidates were more likely to be candidates in races against shoo-in incumbents or in districts their party had no chance of winning.

data from 1984 through 1996. The difference between the success rates of incumbent men and women was statistically insignificant (upwards of 90% for each), as was the difference for male and female open seat candidates (around 50%). In fact, the only statistically significant difference Seltzer found tipped in favor of the women: female challengers for state senate won 15.2% of their elections, compared with 11.6% for males. The difference for state house challengers was insignificant. (Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997, 80) The conclusion that women do as well as like male candidates has been confirmed for other levels of government as well. (Darcy and Schramm 1977; Burrell 1998)

Another common misconception is that women are not as good at raising the money necessary to run a successful campaign. Burrell (1998) showed that female candidates are as adept at fundraising as their male counterparts, if not more so. Starting the late 1980s, women candidates for U.S. House began to outperform men in fundraising and campaign spending. Democratic women were especially prosperous during this period, in comparison to both Democratic men and to Republican women. Much of this difference may be due to the preponderance of PACs oriented toward progressive women (see section 2.7 for more on this subject). Women also received assistance from their parties in roughly equal proportions to men. (Burrell 1998, 35)

The conclusion drawn from these analyses is that similarly situated candidates, regardless of gender, fare equally well with the voters. Women do not have an electoral disadvantage except for a prevalent lack of incumbency. Yet, even if every incumbent legislator (male and female) retired today, there is no

guarantee that the number of women legislators would increase. To achieve parity, qualified women must become candidates in equal proportions to qualified men.

The underlying problem of female representation in state legislatures is the scarcity of women candidates. The proportion of legislators who are women closely mirrors the proportion of legislative candidates who are women. (Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997) To borrow from the language of economics, the problem lies on the supply side, rather than on the demand side. Voters are willing to vote for women, but can do so only when women run. The key to increasing the number of women in office, therefore, is to increase the size and strength of the pool of women candidates.

What makes women choose whether or not to run for office? And when a woman does decide to run, what factors might prevent her from making it to the final ballot? Researchers have found dozens of factors that contribute to a state's wealth or dearth of female legislators. As stated previously, these factors fall into three often-overlapping categories: the eligibility pool, sociopolitical factors, and institutional barriers.

2.4- Eligibility Pool

Many researchers have focused on the occupational and psychological characteristics that make a woman more or less likely to enter politics. A state's proportions of women lawyers, small business owners, degree-holders, and

working women have been shown to correlate significantly with the female legislative percentage (FLP). (Norrander and Wilcox 1998)

Yet, these prime female members of the eligibility pool do not enter politics at the same rate as their male counterparts. Welch (1978) constructed a theoretical model to predict the number of women in state legislatures based on the typical occupational and educational status of state legislators. Her model predicted that, given the occupational and educational status of the population as a whole, women should constitute 25% of legislators. The actual number at the time was less than 8%.

The national FLP average has since risen to 22%, although the proportion of qualified women has also risen considerably. Women today graduate college and earn Master's degrees at higher rates than men, although men still earn more professional degrees. (Freeman 2004) Yet, like their predecessors in the 1970s, these women are still less likely to enter politics than men. This is endemic of a larger phenomenon.

A prerequisite of running for office is some level of interest in politics. Women have consistently underperformed on measures of political interest, knowledge, and activity. A notable exception is a slightly higher voter turnout in presidential election years by women than by men, but this advantage is only as of 1984 and onwards. Women are less likely than men to know the names of their elected officials, which parties control the houses of Congress, and what positions major candidates take on various issues (including abortion, although the male-female knowledge gap is much smaller). (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 2000)

Women do not give campaign donations as often as men, and give smaller amounts when they do. Likewise, women are less likely to volunteer their time for political campaigns, though when they do volunteer they give more hours than men do. (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001)

Fox and Lawless (2004) surveyed men and women in the professions that are the most common precursors to careers in politics (law, business, education, and activism/lobbying). Even among these highly qualified members of the eligibility pool, women were significantly less likely than men to have considered running for office, and were more likely to believe they would lose if they did run.[3] (See also Lake Snell Perry and Associates 2000)

2.5- Sociopolitical Factors

If even the most qualified women are less likely to consider a run for office, we are still left with the question of why this is so. Underlying women's orientation toward politics are deeper issues of socialization. Social influences are notoriously difficult to quantify, but various researchers have developed measures of culture and ideology and compared their effects on women in state legislature. These factors likely operate in multiple ways. They may affect the expectations young women grow up with, leading them to be more or less interested in politics. Girls brought up to believe in traditional gender roles may simply accept the idea of politics as a man's game. These factors may also have

[3] These findings contradict their earlier study that focused only on the state of New York, in which they found no difference between men's and women's consideration of running for office. (Fox, Lawless, and Feeley 2001) This raises the possibility that men and women in different states may have varying likelihoods of considering running for office.

more immediate effects on qualified women in their prime who are weighing whether to risk entering politics in their state. Women in conservative states, for example, may believe the myth that voters are biased against them and decide against running for office.

Political culture

In 1966, Daniel Elazar developed a system for measuring each state's "political culture," a concept that intertwines the social values and political traditions of each state. The tripartite measure classifies a state's culture as *traditionalistic* (valuing traditional political hierarchies and gender roles), *moralistic* (viewing public service as a moral obligation), or *individualistic* (viewing public service as a means of individual advancement). (Elazar 1984) Researchers have used this system as the gold-standard to estimate the effects of political culture on FLP, and have found remarkably consistent results over time. Hill (1981) found a positive correlation between FLP and moralistic states, and a negative correlation for the traditional states. These findings have been confirmed periodically by researchers controlling for political culture while analyzing some other factor (e.g. Rule 1981, Volgy, Schwarz, and Gottlieb 1986, Sanbonmatsu 2002) Norrander and Wilcox (1998) confirmed a positive FLP correlation for moralistic states and a negative correlation for the traditionalistic states, and found a positive but statistically insignificant correlation for the states with individualistic political cultures.

Dominant religion

Closely tied to political culture is the religious composition of a state's population. Johnson (1976) suggested the two were virtually synonymous when he created a measure of political culture parallel to Elazar's based largely on religious census data. Some researchers have favored Johnson's measure over Elazar's (or a hybrid of the two) and obtained similar results. (Nechemias 1985, 1987) Volgy, Schwarz, and Gottlieb (1986) found a strong and significant negative correlation between FLP and high membership in Fundamentalist churches. Norrander and Wilcox (1998) also found negative correlations for states with high proportions of Fundamentalists and Pentecostals, but found a strong positive correlation for states with high Catholic membership.

Ideology

Though related to political culture and religion, ideology is commonly treated as a separate variable. Norrander and Wilcox (1998) found a strong negative correlation between FLP and conservative ideology, while Sanbonmatsu (2002) found a positive correlation for liberal ideology. Both employed a scale developed by Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) that is based on polls of the electorate conducted periodically by CBS and the New York Times.[4] A longitudinal study by Richardson and Cooper (2003) used a different measure,[5] but achieved the same result.

[4] The CBS/NYT poll asks its participants to self-identify as liberal, moderate/not sure, or conservative.

[5] Richardson and Cooper (2003) used the measure of ideology developed by Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson (1998).

Prominent elected women

In an earlier study of mine[6], I found that prominent elected women, such as U.S. Senators and state Attorneys General, had a positive effect on the number of women in state legislature. (Showalter 2005) The study was longitudinal and used time lags to establish causal relationships. Female U.S. Senators in particular had significant and lasting effects on FLP. The implication of these findings is that women in high-visibility elected positions normalize politics as a career choice for women and inspire women to enter the political pipeline.

2.6- Institutional Factors

Party strength

David Niven (1998) surveyed local party leaders and found that male leaders were much less likely to have women on their lists of potential candidates for future legislative races. Women leaders had relatively even numbers of males and females in mind for candidacy, but women comprise only 15% of all local party leaders. It is little surprise, therefore, that women are less likely than men to have received encouragement to run for office from party officials and elected leaders. (Fox and Lawless 2004)

Strong party systems, in which parties have major control of the political process, have been a consistent barrier to women's representation. (Nechemias 1987; Burrell 1993; Norrander and Wilcox 1998) Sanbonmatsu (2003) showed

[6] This study, which was conducted in the fall of 2003, is awaiting publication in the first issue of the Harvard College Journal of Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies.

that the greater the influence of party leaders over nominations, the worse women fare. A dominant Democratic Party in particular has been shown to adversely affect the number of women in the state legislature. This may seem paradoxical, considering that women have, in general, been elected in larger numbers in the Democratic Party. The paradox is especially apparent in states like New York and Massachusetts, which while stereotyped as progressive, have strong Democratic parties with entrenched hierarchies. The increases in FLP in these states have not matched those of progressive states with weak party systems, such as those in the West. Another part of the paradox can be explained by the often overwhelming stranglehold Democrats historically had on legislatures in the South, where women lagged and continue to lag behind their counterparts elsewhere.

Multimember districts

Several researchers have found a positive correlation between multimember electoral district systems[7] and FLP. (Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Norrander and Wilcox 1998) King (2002) examined four states (Alaska, Georgia, Indiana, and Wyoming) that switched from having at least some multimember districts (MMDs) to all single-member districts (SMDs). He matched each "reformed" state with one state that had used MMDs and one state that had used SMDs for the test period, making sure that each matched state was relatively similar in political culture, party structure, and legislative

[7] Though multimember district systems take a variety of forms, the term generally refers to a system in which more than one representative is elected from the same district.

professionalism. King found that though results were mixed during the first years following the test states' switch to SMDs, the long term effect was negative for women's representation. Moreover, the greater the use of MMDs prior to the switch, the greater was the estimated loss in FLP.

Richardson and Cooper (2003), on the other hand, find no significant relationship between MMDs and FLP in their time-series analysis of legislatures between 1975 and 2002. Their methodology is more advanced than previous cross-sectional studies, and their classification of MMDs more precise.[8] It is possible, therefore, that the positive effects of multimember districts found by previous researchers were the results of other phenomena.

Term limits

Because of the electoral and financial advantages of incumbency, and because incumbents are disproportionately male, some have theorized that imposing term limits will help get more women into office. (Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994) In recent years, enough states have begun implementing term limits that empirical examination of this theory has become possible. Carey, Niemi, and Powell (2000) found that women were better represented in states with term limits, even after controlling for other institutional and sociopolitical factors. However, the Republican gains of the mid-90s meant that neither term-limited nor non-term-limited states did particularly well in comparison to the pace of improvement in the 1980s and early 1990s.

[8] For instance, Richardson and Cooper differentiate between states with staggered MMDs (*i.e.* two representatives elected in alternating election cycles for each district) and those with "pure" MMD systems.

Carroll and Jenkins (2001), on the other hand, studied six states with a mix of term-limited and non-term-limited seats in the 1998 elections and found that women did worse in term-limited districts, to the point that they actually lost seats overall[9]. Carroll and Jenkins conclude that more women were forced out by term limits than new candidates emerged to take their place. "[T]erm limits, unaccompanied by efforts to recruit women to run for term-limited seats, may be insufficient to increase the number of women state legislators," they write. (Carroll and Jenkins, 197)

Professionalization and desirability of office

Professionalization, which refers to the salary and standard session length of each legislature, has been on the increase in state legislatures overall. (King 2000) This trend is not necessarily good news for women, however, as professionalized legislatures have been correlated with lower female representation. (Diamond 1977; Nechemias 1987; Norrander and Wilcox 1998) On the whole, men have a higher earning potential than women. Legislatures that are not professionalized (i.e. with low salaries and benefits) may be less attractive to men, thereby reducing competition and leaving room for women to move in. Long sessions prevent legislators from maintaining outside careers, which could also deter men.

Sanbonmatsu (2002) found that the effects of professionalization (or lack thereof) are unevenly distributed across the parties, with only Republican women benefiting from un-professionalized legislatures. Sanbonmatsu speculated that

[9] The states in their study were Arkansas, California, Colorado, Maine, Michigan, Oregon.

Republicans may draw disproportionately from women who are homemakers, who do not need to worry about earning a breadwinner salary or maintaining an outside career.

District magnitude

Barring a gross miscarriage of redistricting, the population that each legislator represents should be more or less equal within each state. Across the states, however, there is wide variation in district magnitude. Several states have fewer than 50 lower-house members, while the New Hampshire House contains 400 representatives. The 75 members of the Rhode Island House represent only a tiny fraction of the number of people that the 80 California Assembly Members represent. Small districts have lower campaign costs not only because there are fewer voters to reach, but also because the diminished prestige of the office may reduce competition. As expected, then, states with small populations and large legislatures have been found to be beneficial to women. (Rule 1981; Nechemias 1987)

Geographic distance to the capital

While it's clear that population size makes a difference in female representation, the effects of geography are less certain. Nechemias (1985) found that women legislators were likely to be from districts closer to the state capital. She speculated that the time spent away from home and family may have discouraged women from farther districts. Norrander and Wilcox (1998), on the

other hand, did not find geographic distance to the capitol or overall geographic size to correlate significantly with female representation. It is possible that the effects of geography have changed over time, or that they coincide with other factors.[10]

2.7- Putting it All Together

Recent research has tended to examine multiple variables at once, using multivariate statistical analyses. This more sophisticated approach attempts to combine the different institutional, sociopolitical, and eligibility pool-related explanations for the variation of female representation in state legislatures. Researchers using this quantitative approach also often look at the way some variables have greater or lesser effects along particular cleavages, such as party or region.

Norrander and Wilcox (1998) compiled an exhaustive list of over 40 variables and sub-variables, covering nearly all the factors studied in the previous literature and adding some others. Their multivariate analysis uses data on women in state legislatures in the year 1995 as the dependent variable, and produces an impressive array of correlations. Norrander and Wilcox find conservative ideology to be the strongest (negative) correlate of women's representation. Political culture, eligibility pool variables, and systemic factors such as multimember districts and legislative turnover rates were also strong correlates. Norrander and Wilcox also break the data down by region, putting the

[10] Districts farther from the capitol may be more rural and conservative, for instance.

South and Mid-Atlantic into one category, and all other states into another. Certain variables, such as religious composition, had different correlation magnitudes for the different regions.

Arceneaux (2001) is one of only a few researchers who have used longitudinal data to study the effects of various factors on the percentage of women in state legislatures. Unfortunately, he averages the years of data together so that it essentially remains a cross-sectional correlation analysis with a larger data set. His findings do reinforce those of Norrander and Wilcox (1998), however, and also posit the independence of a "feminist index" variable that is independent of ideology and political culture.

Sanbonmatsu (2002) wisely uses longitudinal data to its full advantage by performing time-series regression analysis. This approach allows researchers tentatively to identify causal relationships, rather than mere correlations. It is an important methodological improvement for studying women in politics because it can help quell concerns of mutual causation. Sanbonmatsu's study finds significant effects on FLP for variables such as party strength, ideology, political culture, women in the workforce, and region.

Sanbonmatsu also adds the dimension of party affiliation to determine if particular factors affect Republicans and Democrats differently. Legislative professionalization, for instance, significantly affected only Republican women. Democratic dominance adversely affected Democratic women much more than Republican women, providing further evidence of the "Democratic paradox."

Richardson and Cooper (2003) also employ time-series analysis in their study of the effects of multimember districts on female and African-American representation in state legislatures. As mentioned previously, they do not find a significant relationship between multimember districts and FLP, but they do confirm the significance of many of their control variables, including ideology, professionalization, and turnover.

2.8- Recruitment Groups

Recent research indicates that progress for women in state legislatures is slowing down. (Carroll 2004; Showalter 2005) The national FLP average has stagnated, and many states have seen decreases from their peak FLPs in the 1980s and 90s. Because we can no longer simply depend on the march of time to increase the number of women in state legislatures, actively recruiting more women into politics will become more and more necessary. Unfortunately, there is scant research concerning the effectiveness of women's political recruitment efforts at the state level (hence, the research conducted for this thesis).

We can glean some insights from previous research on national organizations. In national races, it is clear that women's political support organizations in aggregate have disproportionately helped Democratic women. (Francia 2001; Rozell 2000) Most of the major organizations, partisan or otherwise, support only pro-choice candidates. While the pro-choice position may not be the exclusive realm of the Democrats, Republican women who do endorse abortion rights are often unwilling to accept funding from pro-choice

groups for fear that it might not play well with their constituency. Thus, the pro-choice Republican women's group WISH List has never achieved the strength and stature of EMILY's List, the powerful Democratic women's group on which WISH List was modeled. Likewise, many ostensibly nonpartisan women's groups end up supporting mostly Democrats (a phenomenon also seen at the state level in Chapter 3). In 1994, for instance, Democrats received almost 80% of the early money given by the nonpartisan, pro-choice Women's Campaign Fund. (Francia 2001, 11) First term Democratic Congresswomen in 1994 also were able to collect, on average, over $60,000 more in total PAC donations than their Democratic male counterparts. (Burrell 1998, 32)

These advantages for Democratic women tend to compound on themselves because of the power of early money, a specialty of PACs such as EMILY's List (whose moniker and motto is "Early Money Is Like Yeast—it helps raise the dough"). Candidates who are able to raise early money are more likely to look viable to parties, individual donors, and other PACs. Francia (2001) presents strong statistical evidence of the power of early money for women running for Congress. Also called "seed money," these contributions to candidates are given early in the campaign with the specific intent of helping the candidate raise more money later. The Democratic women in Francia's study received, on average, $2,640 in seed money from women's PACs to the Republican womens' $326. This advantage translated into major gains in total receipts for Democratic women and a better overall success rate on Election Day.

Cooperman (2001) also notes that the national Democratic groups tend to have closer relationships with their party than do Republican groups. "Indeed, it has become virtually impossible to distinguish Democratic Party efforts to recruit women candidates from candidate recruitment strategies practiced by EMILY's List," Cooperman writes. (Cooperman 2001, 15)

At the state level, the subject of women's political recruitment organizations remains largely unexplored. Boles (1984) speculated that Texas's low level of female representation might be due to the state's similarly below-average level of membership in women's organizations such as the National Organization for Women (NOW), the National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC), and the League of Women Voters. Volgy, Schwarz, and Gottlieb (1986) were the first to look at the relationship between women's political groups and the proportion of women in state legislatures in aggregate. They found a strong correlation between a state's level of NOW membership and the percentage of legislative seats held by women. Norrander and Wilcox (1998) confirmed that NOW membership is a correlate of FLP, even when other institutional and sociopolitical factors are taken into account.

These correlations do not prove causation, however. It is entirely possible that there is some hidden factor that produces both high membership in feminist organizations and many women legislators, and that the former has no independent effect on the latter. An increasingly common method statisticians use to estimate a causal relationship is through multiple time-series regression analysis. In particular, panel data methods that account for fixed geographic and

time effects separately have been used more frequently in recent years. It is this type of analysis that I shall undertake in Chapters 4 and 5 to determine the efficacy of women's political recruitment organizations in helping women get elected to state legislatures. To be able to attempt this analysis, however, I had to create a new dataset to describe the efforts of women's groups over time and across the states. Chapter 3 describes my data collection process and the initial impressions I gained from interviewing the leaders of state-level women's political recruitment organizations.

Chapter 3

Collecting the Data

This chapter summarizes the process of compiling a longitudinal dataset to describe the characteristics and activities of state-level women's political recruitment organizations. Over 100 female leaders were interviewed about their organization's history, activities, and partisan leanings.[11] Additional information was gathered through archival and web-based research. Though systematic efforts to recruit female candidates were rare, the anecdotal evidence gathered during the interviews suggested that women's organizations have indeed helped women enter and move forward in the political pipeline. Because of the predominance of Democratic and pro-choice organizations, however, the positive effects interviewees described were likely conferred more on Democratic women than on Republican women. These findings helped shape the hypotheses tested empirically in later chapters of this study.

[11] In no case was the leader or contact person of an organization a man.

3.1– Building the List of Organizations

To attempt any kind of longitudinal statistical analysis of the effectiveness of women's political recruitment organizations, I needed to know what groups had existed over some period of time. Unfortunately, a longitudinal data series describing the presence and characteristics of state-level women's political recruitment organizations did not exist. Therefore, a major effort of this study was the construction of an historical (1970 to the present) state-level dataset.

Because there was no comprehensive registry of women's political recruitment organizations, I had to create my own catalog through partial lists and an extensive interview process. I started with a list of contact information given to me by the National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC) for their current state chapters. It should be noted that I did not attempt to obtain information on the state chapters of organizations such as NOW or NARAL. While these organizations do focus on women's issues, they support both male and female (pro-choice) candidates. I wanted to pursue only those organizations with the explicit goal of aiding female candidates.

I relied on a list of women's political action committees (PACs) and donor networks compiled by the Center for American Women and Politics.[12] A representative of EMILY's List helped me locate additional women's PACs. Lastly, public disclosure websites such as *opensecrets.org* and *followthemoney.org* were helpful for finding recently-active organizations.

[12] http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/Facts/pacs.pdf.

Finding defunct organizations was more difficult. For the lapsed NWPC chapters, I looked at the NWPC archives at the Radcliffe Institute's Schlesinger Library. The archives included contact lists for all state chapters between 1977 and 1991. A 1994 issue of *Campaigns and Elections* provided a list of over 50 national, state, and local women's PACs, many of which were no longer operational. (Padgett 2004) The contact information from these sources was invariably out of date, but through persistent Google searching I was usually able to find either the contact's new information or the name and contact information for someone else who had been involved in the organization.

My other main strategy was networking during the interview process itself. I asked interviewees to tell me about other programs that were operating in their state, or had operated in their state in the past. Often the interviewees would tell me about organizations I already had on my list. This "snowballing" method was a useful way of determining that I had probably obtained a complete list of organizations, though there was always room for uncertainty. A shortcoming of studying any topic over time is the likelihood that some information will simply be lost from the earlier years. Records will be lost and memories will fade. By casting several nets, I attempted to overcome this problem as best as could reasonably be expected from a one-year project.

In all, I contacted representatives from over 100 organizations, and obtained information for additional organizations from websites and archives. With only two exceptions (Mississippi and New Hampshire), every state contained at least one women's organization at some point during the three-

decade time span of the study. The remainder of this chapter describes the interview process and my initial impressions of the organizations.

3.2- The Interviews

Interviews were conducted over the phone, though they were often arranged via email. The interviews were conversational in form and tone; I did not use a set of pre-worded questions. Instead, I used a list of topics to guide the conversation. As I talked with the interviewees, I typed notes into a template based on these topics, reproduced below in Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2

Organization name:
Who talked to:
Year began:
Party Affiliation:
Other attributes:
Recruitment:
Funding:
Training:
Endorsements:
Other Programs:
Primarily targets:
Words of wisdom:
Other programs in state:
Other programs elsewhere:
Other programs that no longer exist:
Institutional memory point person:

Often, just asking the simple question "What does your organization do?" was enough to gain much of the information I needed. Many interviewees were able to direct me to other women's political organizations in their respective states. Of equal use, though, were the interviewees who said that their organization was essentially the only game in town. This was a helpful step in

determining if I had found all the organizations there had been in the particular state.

3.3- Recruitment

Though recruitment is the overarching focus of this study, it quickly became apparent that direct recruitment of female candidates is a serious challenge that few organizations have systematically attempted to tackle. Most organizations did not have the resources to design and implement a formal recruitment program. "Recruitment is the hardest thing ever. Nobody wants to give you money for recruitment. You can convince people to give money for a candidate, or even for training, but nobody will give money for recruitment," reported Linda Bowker of New Jersey's GROW Republican Women. Organizations tended to use their limited resources to support existing candidates. Only one organization, the Minnesota Candidate Development Coalition, held recruitment as its primary purpose.

Nonetheless, most organizations described some amount of informal recruitment. The women involved in an organization formed the hub of a network that extended out to their social and professional acquaintances. When organizations identified an open seat or an uncooperative incumbent that they wanted to unseat, they drew upon this network of women. "We just ask ourselves, 'Who would be good to run against so-and-so?'" commented Ginny Stogner of the Texas Women's Political Caucus.

Several interviewees mentioned training sessions as a major method of expanding this network and encouraging specific individuals to make a bid for office. "When we do trainings, we do outreach. We're looking for people we may not even know about yet," said Madeline Wachter of the Arizona Women's Political Caucus. Women attending training sessions for the purposes of becoming campaign managers could find themselves recruited to become candidates themselves. "We have workshops annually, usually in larger areas like Milwaukee and Madison," said Elaine Capelle of the Wisconsin Women's Political Caucus. "The participants learn how to run a campaign, how to ask for the buck, how to set up finances, how to take care of the books. Once they've come to one of those training sessions, we get a feel for people who might make a viable candidate."

Often, though, organizations look within their own membership. Interviewees commonly mentioned members or leaders who had run for office. A handful of interviewees had themselves been candidates. "I was a recruit!" said Rhode Island State Senator Rhoda Perry, a former chair of the Rhode Island Women's Political Caucus. "There was a female Senator who wanted to run for the Mayor of Providence, so I barely had time to get started with fundraising to run for her seat. The Caucus really helped." Organization members who chose to run for office had a built-in "old girls' club" to support them. Organizations also often worked with elected women nearing retirement to help recruit a successor and maintain the strength of the pipeline.

3.4 – Funding, Training, and Endorsements

Funding

In lieu of direct recruitment, most organizations in this study supported female candidates through funding, training, and endorsements. The connection between training and informal recruitment has already been discussed. Funding may also act as an indirect method of recruitment by providing incentives to women weighing their own viability as potential candidates. Women who know they would receive funding from women's organizations might not so easily succumb to the myth that women are poor fundraisers.

Independent of the recruitment angle, funding is clearly a boon to already-declared female candidates and their chances of actually winning on Election Day. Many organizations in this study were 501(c)3 Political Action Committees (PACs) structured for the specific purpose of providing money to selected female candidates. These PACs were mostly Democratic and often billed themselves as "baby EMILY's Lists." Depending on the campaign finance laws of the state, the PACs would either raise money for candidates through fundraisers and membership dues, or would bundle members' personal checks made out to specific candidates à la EMILY's List. Other more diversified organizations, including many state chapters of the National Women's Political Caucus, set up 501(c)3 PACs of their own so that they could give money to candidates in addition to performing their other activities.

The amount of money distributed varied greatly across the organization pool. Some organizations gave only very small amounts, lending support that was

more symbolic than substantive. Others racked up impressive numbers, such as the $100,000 in distributed funds given by the Greater Kansas City Women's Political Caucus every election cycle. By and large, however, providing financial support for female candidates was identified as a serious challenge with numerous pitfalls. For some nonpartisan organizations[13], competing partisanship within the membership and leadership led to paralysis on the issue of funding. "We give personal checks, but it's hard to give checks through the group. We have men and women, Republican and Democrat. It's kind of hard to get a consensus on candidates," said Faye Kennedy Daly of the Hawaii Women's Political Caucus. Though I did not collect data on total contributions, I sensed that the partisan organizations had a much easier time raising and distributing funds than the nonpartisan organizations.[14]

Several interviewees complained of strict, even "draconian" state campaign finance laws that prevented them from giving meaningful amounts to their chosen candidates. Some tried to work around the rules through networking and mobilizing their members. "In Georgia you can't bundle checks, so we give information to our members so they can make contributions after we have given the max. Sometimes our members will hold fundraisers at their houses," said Melita Easters of the Georgia WIN List. Other organizations turn to alternate means of support. Many interviewees said they encouraged members to volunteer

[13] In this study, the terms bipartisan, nonpartisan, and multipartisan are used interchangeably. Several organizations insisted on the term "multipartisan" because it reflects openness to all parties, including third parties, while also not implying a perfect balance of partisanship. Very commonly, though, these organizations reported that their leadership and membership were predominantly Democratic.

[14] The nonpartisan Greater Kansas City Women's Political Caucus is an obvious exception to this rule. It is possible that issues of partisanship are diminished on a local level. The Cincinnati Women's Political Caucus also reported great success with funding local candidates.

for campaigns, though such mobilization was usually ad hoc or informal. "We have clean elections laws here in Arizona," Madeline Wachter said. "There's an optional program, and if people opt to do it, they have to collect a given number of $5 contributions. For state candidates who opt to be in the system, they're not looking for fundraising—they're looking for other help."

Training

Training sessions, while serving organizations' ulterior recruitment motives, are obviously intended for the primary purpose of aiding candidates and campaign managers. Whereas funding was a strong suit of partisan organizations, training was prevalent among nonpartisan groups, such as the state Women's Political Caucuses (WPCs). The WPCs commonly held training sessions yearly or once every election cycle. These training sessions were usually full-day or weekend events with a variety of scheduled activities, including fundraising strategy sessions, media training, speeches by successful candidates and campaign managers, and roundtable discussions in which participants could meet and learn from one another. Some interviewees from nonpartisan training organizations said they would usually invite Democratic and Republican campaign experts to lead partisan breakout sessions designed to help women navigate their party's particular framework.

A few organizations in this study were devoted solely to training. These institutional groups were much more systematic about training, and were often connected with a university. Their training schedules were usually more intense

than the single-event sessions sponsored by other organizations. The Yale Women's Campaign School, for instance, holds a five-day training session each summer and one-day sessions periodically throughout the year. Among the most intensive training groups were three partisan organizations[15] that administered training periodically over several months. These organizations admitted only a handful of women each year into their program, but gave hands-on training that included fieldtrips to their state's capitol and individually tailored advice from experts and officials.

Endorsements

Almost all organizations in this study routinely selected female candidates to endorse.[16] The WPCs used a standard questionnaire intended to determine a female candidate's stance on abortion, the Equal Rights Amendment, and pay equality. Particularly progressive WPCs added their own criteria concerning gay rights, affirmative action, and entitlement programs. These questionnaires would be sent to all female candidates, and only those returning the questionnaire with the correct answers would receive the WPC's endorsement (and any funding that might be attached to it). Other groups also used questionnaires, though interviews were common as well. With the exception of the Republican organizations and a small number of nonpartisan groups, women's organizations would only endorse pro-choice candidates.

[15] Illinois's Lincoln Series and New Jersey's Christine Todd Whitman Excellence in Public Service Series are Republican training organizations. The Illinois Women's Institute for Leadership, a Democratic training organization, began as a response to the Lincoln Series.
[16] The exceptions were the training-only organizations and some Southern groups.

A few organizations, including some renegade WPCs[17], endorsed exemplary male candidates, though sometimes these men were given a lesser distinction like "recommended," rather than full endorsement. These endorsements rarely came with financial support attached, but were intended to show solidarity with pro-feminist men. "We do endorse men, which is a violation of National policy," said Mary Overgaard of the Oregon Women's Political Caucus. "We have had so many dreadful, right-wing nutcase women running here, who are against everything we stand for. Why would we not endorse the man who is right on our issues?"

3.5 – The Partisan Divide and the Issue of Choice

Francia (2001) and Cooperman (2001) noted that on the national scale, women's organizations disproportionately help Democrats. If anything, this divide was more pronounced at the state level. Democratic organizations, particularly those that gave funding (i.e. "baby EMILY's Lists"), were far more numerous than Republican organizations. Most of the Democratic organizations were explicitly pro-choice and would not endorse pro-life women, even if they were of the correct party. None of the few Republican organizations studied was pro-choice, though none was pro-life either.

The nonpartisan organizations were almost always pro-choice, and very commonly reported problems finding Republican women to endorse or support. This partisan impasse was almost always reported as a recent and growing

[17] Endorsing men is against NWPC policy.

phenomenon. "We are bipartisan, but it's getting harder and harder to endorse Republicans. . . We have not been able to endorse a Republican in a long time," said Mary Overgaard. Many Republican women are simply pro-life, but even those who are privately pro-choice may be unwilling to accept the endorsement of a pro-choice organization for fear of negative response from voters and party leaders.

Reports of the partisan divide over abortion were not restricted to one region, though it is likely that the degree of polarization varies. Tamara Morris of the Greater Kansas City Women's Political Caucus, which supports women in both Kansas and Missouri, said it was much easier to find moderate Republicans to support in Kansas than in Missouri. Unsurprisingly, the abortion divide was most acute in the South. "We are multipartisan in name only," said Betsey Nowland Curry of the Kentucky Women's Political caucus. "There are extremely few Kentucky Republicans who are pro-choice. 99% of us are Democrats." This extreme polarization was mentioned by many Southern interviewees. In some states, even Democrats were unlikely to accept endorsements from pro-choice organizations. "We've had a real hard time getting women elected. If we endorse someone, it's the kiss of death because of the pro-choice issue," said Robbie Madden of the Louisiana Women's Political Caucus. Many Southern organizations simply stopped giving endorsements, focusing instead on supporting candidates informally or behind-the-scenes.

A few nonpartisan organizations were explicitly position-less on the issue of abortion. "We don't have a Pro-choice litmus test. . . I find it really strange

that we put that constraint on women, but not on men," said Kris Geddings of the South Carolina-based B-List. "I find it astounding that women have such trouble getting past that one issue." These organizations place a higher priority on getting women elected, regardless of party or orientation on specific issues. "We don't have any litmus tests. We bend over backwards to get women to run because we need their voice and their perspective at the table," said Leann Jacobsen, of the Iowa Women in Public Policy Group.

3.6 – Trends in the Organization Pool

Nearly every state has contained at least one women's political recruitment organization for some part of the three-decade time frame of this study, and many states have had multiple organizations operating at once. This section summarizes the distribution of women's organizations over time.

The era of modern women's political recruitment organizations began in earnest with the founding of the National Women's Political Caucus in late 1971. In the following years, NWPC chapters were founded in almost every state, though many of these chapters have since closed. Thus, there is a large increase in the total number of state-level organizations in the early 1970s, as Figure 3.61 demonstrates.[18]

[18] The tables in this section employ the dataset developed in section 4.21. As that section describes in greater detail, the number of organizations in the final dataset used in this study's quantitative analysis is somewhat smaller than the number of organizations for which information was collected.

FIGURE 3.61



The total number of state-level women's political recruitment organizations has increased over time, with only a few small dips in the total. More new organizations have sprung up than have closed. The distribution of these organizations, however, has changed over time. Figure 3.62 displays the number of states containing *at least one* organization.

FIGURE 3.62

The number of states containing at least one organization has decreased over time. This trend can be partially explained by the fortunes of the NWPC chapters, which constitute a large percentage of this study's total organization pool. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, most states had a chapter of the NWPC. When some of these chapters folded in the late 1980s and early 1990s, new organizations evidently did not arise to take their place. Thus, even though there has been growth in the total number of women's organizations, these organizations are clustered together in some states and remain wholly absent from others. In 2003, 30 states contained all of the women's organization pool (over 50 organizations in total), while 20 states did not contain a single organization.

The analysis I undertake in the following chapters examines the effects of these organizations on the percentage of state lower-house seats held by women. As Chapter 4 outlines in detail, my models estimate the marginal returns of each organization in the pool. Thus, even though the organizations have been unevenly distributed across the states, their average effects can still be measured.

Chapter 4

Methodology

This chapter outlines the methodological approach I took to reach the results I present in Chapter 5. Setting up the study required choosing which years and states to include, coding many variables (independent, dependent, control, and dummy variables), and formal specification of the statistical models to test my hypotheses.

4.1 – Revised Hypotheses and Overview of Methodology

The basic hypothesis of this study is that state-level women's political recruitment organizations have a positive effect on female representation, measured in this study by the percentage of state lower house seats held by women. After gaining a better understanding of the activities and characteristics of these organizations through the interview process, I now formulate more nuanced hypotheses about their effects. Anecdotal evidence from the

interviewees suggests that women's organizations have made a positive impact on female representation in state government (including state legislatures). Thus, my first hypothesis is as follows:

1) State-level women's political recruitment organizations have a positive and significant effect on the percentage of state lower house seats held by women.

Because the partisan organization pool is skewed toward the Democrats, and because the nonpartisan pool is skewed toward pro-Choice positions, my second hypothesis is as follows:

2) In this study, the total organization pool will have a larger effect on Democratic women than on Republican women. Even the nonpartisan organizations will help Democrats more than they help Republicans because of the pro-choice issue.

To test these hypotheses, this study employs fixed-effects multiple regression analysis with state-level panel data. This methodology has the advantage of allowing a formal test of the efficacy of women's groups on female candidates' electoral success while controlling for effects related to time and geography. (Stock and Watson 2003) The availability of data for the control variables listed below constrained the end-points of the dataset to the years 1973

to 2003. Even-numbered years were excluded because legislative elections only occur every two years, so opportunities to increase or decrease the number of female legislators only occur in alternate years. Odd-numbered years were retained because those are the years when newly elected or reelected legislators actually begin to serve their term. Nebraska was excluded because its legislature is unicameral and nonpartisan, making it problematic to compare with other legislatures. After the exclusions, the total number of state-year observations was 784 (49 states multiplied by 16 years).

4.2 – Coding the Data

4.21 – Organization-Related Variables

The pool of organizations I analyze in Chapter 5 is somewhat smaller than the full list of organizations I interviewed. Some organizations turned out to be too local to count as a statewide organization. For instance, the South Carolina Women's Political Caucus, which operated in the late 1980s and early 1990s, reportedly never grew much beyond its Spartanburg headquarters, while the Women's TAP Fund served only certain counties in upstate New York. Local organizations were not included in the study, although I occasionally counted networks of local groups as one whole organization if they covered most of the state.[19] A few organizations were excluded because they lacked sufficient focus on female candidates. These included the Democratic Women's Club of Delaware, which raised money for male and female Democrats alike, and the

[19] For instance, I counted the strong St. Louis and Greater Kansas City Women's Political Caucuses and the weaker figurehead Missouri Women's Political Caucus as one organization.

South Dakota Women's Advocacy Network, which was primarily a lobbying group. Still others were excluded because they were very new.[20] In all, 87 organizations made it into the study.[21]

The methods for obtaining information on each organization were enumerated in Chapter 3. Coding this information was a relatively simple process. If a nonpartisan organization was present in a state for the given year, a 1 was entered for the variable NPORG. If there was more than one organization for a particular state-year, the appropriate number was entered. The variables DEMORG and REPORG (for Democratic and Republican organizations) were coded in the same manner. ORGTOTAL was calculated as the sum of NPORG, DEMORG, and REPORG. The variables FUND and TRAIN specified the number of organizations that engaged in funding and training, respectively, for the given state-year.[22] It should be noted that these activity-related variables were not broken down by partisan status, and so should be assumed to skew Democrat because of the higher number of Democrat organizations overall.[23]

In a small number of cases, the information I obtained about a particular organization did not come from an interview, but from archived information or secondary sources (such as a website). Because information on these organizations was less reliable than in the larger sample, in Chapter 5 I will run a "conservative estimate" model that removes the states for which organizational

[20] The availability of certain control variables dictated that 2003 would be the end-point of the study. Any organization founded in 2003 or 2004 was deemed too new.
[21] One organization, the Yale Women's Campaign School, was counted twice (once in Connecticut and once in New York) based on the most common origins of their alumni.
[22] I did not include a variable for endorsements or pro-Choice status, because nearly every organization was pro-Choice and made endorsements.
[23] Breaking down the FUND and TRAIN variables by partisan status seemed unwise, because it would have reduced the number of non-zero observations to the point of statistical uselessness.

data is less certain. This model is among the preliminary analyses described in section 5.2, and will determine whether the less precise organizational data have any deleterious impact on the main results.

4.22 - Dependent Variables

This study concerns itself only with the lower house of each state because the lower house is closer to the "entry-level" of politics than the upper house. It is also more straightforward to analyze one chamber along partisan lines than to juggle two chambers with different partisan complements. Most of the data for women state representatives came from the Center for American Women and Politics (CAWP), which publishes state-by-state fact sheets on its website.[24] CAWP's data begin in the late 1970s, so earlier data were obtained from the exhaustive registries of women legislators compiled by Elizabeth Cox (1996). These data were all differentiated by party. Tim Storey at the National Conference of State Legislators graciously shared data for the total partisan makeup of state lower houses for the entire range of years.

If there were no assumption of party difference, then the obvious dependent variable would be simply the percent of each state's lower-house representatives that are women (which I will call FEM%OFTOTAL). However, even the nonpartisan organizations studied appeared anecdotally to be more favorable to Democrats than Republicans. It is prudent, therefore, to develop different dependent variables for women of the two parties.

[24] http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/Facts4.html.

There are two ways of looking at the partisan gender makeup, both of which may be useful for different models. One option is to measure each party's female delegation as a percent of the entire chamber. The variable DEM%OFTOTAL is the percent of the total number of lower-house seats occupied by female Democrats. Likewise, REP%OFTOTAL is the percent of lower house seats occupied by Republican women.

The other way of looking at the gender composition is to measure women as a percent of their own party's caucus (male and female) in the lower house. The variable DEM%OFDEM is the percent of House Democrats who are women; REP%OFREP is the percent of House Republicans who are women. This latter method tends to produce a much wider range of values. During the earlier years of the study, many parties had no female representatives, but in more recent years women have occasionally constituted over half of their party's delegation. In Idaho's 2004 election, for instance, Democrats won only 13 House seats out of 70 total, but 9 of those Democrats (69%) were women.[25]

4.23 – Institution-Related Control Variables

Democratic Margin (DEMMARGIN)

As discussed in Chapter 2, the "Democratic paradox" says that Democratic women fare worse in legislatures dominated by Democrats and better in legislatures dominated by Republicans (and vice versa for Republican women).

[25] Or in Washington State, for example, the House's party composition completely reversed in the 1994 elections, going from 67% Democrat to 69% Republican in one fell swoop. Democrats were decimated, falling from 66 to 30 out of the 98-member chamber. Democratic women, however, only dropped from 28 to 20, meaning they constituted a full two-thirds of the remaining Democratic delegation.

The variable DEMMARGIN is calculated as the Democratic percent of the legislature minus the Republican percent of the legislature. A chamber with 60% Democrats and 40% Republicans would have a 20-point Democratic margin. When there are more Republicans than Democrats, the value for DEMMARGIN is negative.[26]

Turnover (TURNOVER)

Though the empirical verdict is still out on the effects of term limits on women's electoral fortunes, it is generally agreed that a low rate of turnover is not helpful. If male incumbents never leave office, there is no room for outsiders to enter. The variable TURNOVER is defined as the percent of the legislative roster that has changed since the last election cycle. If 70% of one term's incumbents return for a second term, the turnover is said to be 30%. Turnover is broader than term limits alone, because it also encompasses retirements (forced or voluntary), deaths, and resignations. It also includes prior incumbents who ran and lost, and so did not take office in the current legislature. (The winning challengers, of course, might be men or women). TURNOVER gives some measure of the level of entrenchment incumbents enjoy in a given state; certain states, whether because of the political culture or the strength of the parties, tend to reelect their legislators year after year, while others states tend to be more restless.[27] Kevin Arceneaux

[26] I once again thank Tim Storey for providing longitudinal data on legislative party compositions.
[27] Certain states elected representatives to four year terms for all or part of the time frame, meaning that turnover was zero or near zero in alternating election cycles. Alabama, Louisiana, Maryland, and Mississippi always used 4-year terms. In these states, opportunities for newcomers were half as frequent, giving an advantage to the (mostly male) incumbents.

and Gary Moncrief graciously shared turnover data for certain states and years. Additional data were obtained from the *Book of the States* series.[28]

Low Pay, Long Session (LOWPAYLONGSESSION)

Sanbonmatsu (2002) confirmed the theory that when legislative seats are less attractive to men (*i.e.* low pay combined with long session), women will benefit from the decreased competition. Kira Sanbonmatsu helpfully shared with me the dummy variable she created to encompass this "unattractiveness" factor, which she found significantly and positively helped Republican women.[29] For every state-year in which the legislature had low pay and long sessions, a 1 is coded. All other years are coded 0. Because Sanbonmatsu's dataset ends in 1999, I filled in the most recent years of data according to the usual entry for each state during the 1990s.[30] The dummy was fairly stable over time; states with unprofessionalized legislatures generally stayed that way. Still, because of the uncertainty of this filled-in data, my study's conservative models will stop in 1999 (see section 5.2). The standard models, which run through 2003, use the augmented LOWPAYLONGSESSION dummy.

[28] There were a handful of missing points in this dataset for state-years in which the number of legislative seats had been changed, necessitating reapportionment. Massachusetts, for instance, went from 240 seats to 160 seats in 1978. I did not want to drop entire states or years because of these gaps, but averaging the two adjacent years to fill in the missing entries did not make sense intuitively. In every case of reapportionment total number of seats was reduced, not increased. As this creates a surplus of incumbents relative to available seats, I entered a 0 for the turnover in these years. Though there was likely some amount of turnover for these years, it would almost certainly be very low, if not zero exactly.

[29] See Chapter 5 for evidence that this variable significantly and positively affects women of both parties.

[30] The LOWPAYLONGSESSION did not change very much over time. Thus, the "usual" entry for a state was whatever its entry had been (1 or 0) for the years leading up to 2001 and 2003.

District Magnitude (RELATIVE SEATS)

An additional measure of competitiveness is the district magnitude, or number of people per legislative seat. High-population states with small numbers of legislators have increased competition for each legislative seat. In California, for instance, there are currently fewer than three assembly seats per million residents. As a result, California legislative campaigns can be quite costly, which can discourage potential female candidates and party leaders, two groups that typically underestimate women's ability to raise money. New Hampshire, on the other hand, has 400 members in its lower house and only a million residents, so competition for these seats is very low (and therefore arguably more hospitable to potential women candidates).

Of course, almost all states increased in population over the time frame studied, so it was important to create a relative measure of district magnitude for each year to prevent a spurious relationship. The variable RELATIVESEATS is calculated by taking a state's number of lower house seats per million residents and dividing it by the nationwide average. In 2003, for instance, California was at 12% of the national average for seats per million residents, while New Hampshire was at 1600%.

4.24 – Sociopolitical Control Variables

Ideology (IDEOLOGY)

It is well known that conservative states have fewer women legislators than their more liberal counterparts. Given the evidence that women win (as often as men) when women run, it is once again best to view the effects of ideology as a supply side problem, rather than a demand side problem. Voters from conservative states are not less likely to vote for a woman, but women in conservative states may be less likely to choose to run.

In either case, it is important to control for the effects of ideology. Though many cross-sectional studies have used data from CBS/New York Times polls in the manner of Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993), the CBS/NYT data is not robust enough to disaggregate into data for each state and year of the study. Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson (1998) developed a measure of ideology based on the conservative/liberal ratings of U.S. Congressmen and share of the vote each received in his or her district. This dataset is available for each state, and has been updated through 2002.[31] In this measure, a higher value represents a more liberal voter ideology and a lower number more conservative. Because ideology would most affect women in the earliest stages of deciding to run, this variable will be lagged two years to reflect conditions prior to the election cycle in question.

[31] ICPSR #1208.

Prominent Elected Women (FEMSEN, FEMAG, FEMGOV)

In an earlier study, I found that the presence of female U.S. Senators or Attorneys General had a positive, time-lagged effect on FLP.[32] The variable FEMSEN is coded 1 for every year in which a woman served as U.S. Senator for the given state, and 0 for every year in which no woman served. In the rare instance when both of a state's two senators were women, a 2 was entered. The variable FEMAG is coded 1 for every state-year in which a female attorney general served, and 0 for all other years.

A surprising result of my earlier study was that female governors did not have a significant effect on FLP. Nonetheless, I am including the variable FEMGOV, which is coded in the same manner as FEMAG. The earlier study did not adequately control for other state-specific factors, and also did not differentiate by party. The variable FEMGOV may yet have a significant effect in light of the control variables, and may have differing effects on Democratic and Republican women. FEMSEN, FEMAG, and FEMGOV will all be lagged, as per the earlier study.

4.25 – Eligibility Pool Control Variables

Women's College Education (EDUCATION)

It was necessary to have some measure of the strength of each state's eligibility pool. Norrander and Wilcox (1998) use a variety of eligibility pool-related variables, including women lawyers, small business owners, degree-holders, and women in the labor force as a whole. Unfortunately, no data exist

[32] Showalter (2005).

over time and across all states for variables as specific as women lawyers or business owners. I chose to use data on women's education status as my measure of eligibility pool strength.

Current Population Survey data was culled using Unicon Research utilities[33] and manipulated in Microsoft Excel. The variable EDUCATION is the percent of each state's female population over 25 years of age that has attained at least some college education. For most states, CPS education data begin in 1977, so I filled in data for 1973-1976 using exponential projections backwards for the states without CPS data for the earliest years. This allows the use of more years of data, but is less reliable because of the projections. When running a more conservative model, I will use 1977 as the starting point to avoid using these projections. Still, the benefits of the extra years outweigh the uncertainty of the projected data, so 1973 will remain the starting point for the standard models.

4.26 – Dummy Variables

Region Dummy Variables

Norrander and Wilcox (1998), Sanbonmatsu (2002), and others have shown that some variation can be explained simply by regional differences. Controlling for the South has been particularly common, as it has been the most cohesive region in terms of the success (or lack thereof) of women in legislature. Almost as cohesive is the West, whose women have had a great deal of success even in those states with an otherwise conservative character (*e.g.*. Idaho,

[33] www.unicon.com.

Montana, and Nevada). Finally, the Northeast has been characterized by early success but slow progress.

The variable REGION (SOUTH) is defined as the thirteen formerly Confederated states, plus West Virginia and Missouri. REGION (WEST) is defined as all states west of the jagged vertical line formed by the eastern borders of Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, and New Mexico (and thus including those states).[34] REGION (NORTHEAST) includes Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, and the states of New England.

State Dummy Variables

An alternate method of controlling for regional differences is simply to make each state a region unto itself and give each a dummy variable. The purpose of state dummy variables is to control for all the state-related factors that we cannot measure. In Chapter 5, I empirically test models with the region dummy variables and other models with state dummy variables to determine which dummy set is more appropriate to the task.

Year Dummy Variables

Additionally, dummy variables specific to each year of the study let us control for the unobservable effects of particular years. For instance, the "Year of the Woman" in 1992 appears to have had a unique set of factors that made it good

[34] REGION (WEST) also includes Alaska and Hawaii.

for women.[35] Likewise, some of the overall increase in women's representation can simply be attributed to the march of time, and not to any of the specific control variables enumerated above.

4.27 – Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Studied

Table 4.27 provides descriptive statistics for all the variables used in this analysis, except for the year and state dummy variables.

Table 4.27

Table of Variables in the Analysis: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Median	Maximum	Minimum	Std Dev	N
FEM%OFTOTAL	0.161	0.150	0.433	0.000	0.095	929
DEM%OFTOTAL	0.093	0.081	0.292	0.000	0.060	929
DEM%OFDEM	0.179	0.156	0.692	0.000	0.123	929
REP%OFTOTAL	0.068	0.059	0.283	0.000	0.053	929
REP%OFREP	0.155	0.150	0.600	0.000	0.101	929
ORGTOTAL	0.851	1.000	5.000	0.000	0.800	882
NPORG	0.723	1.000	3.000	0.000	0.616	882
DEMORG	0.102	0.000	2.000	0.000	0.307	882
REPORG	0.026	0.000	2.000	0.000	0.198	882
FUND	0.367	0.000	3.000	0.000	0.598	882
TRAIN	0.311	0.000	2.000	0.000	0.485	882
DEMMARGIN	15.448	14.667	100.000	-74.286	36.902	929
TURNOVER	25.278	25.000	73.000	0.000	12.444	784
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.073	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.260	784
RELATIVE SEATS	2.390	1.353	19.311	0.120	3.058	882
IDEOLOGY	47.370	47.270	90.102	9.136	15.561	833
EDUCATION	32.982	32.669	67.753	0.000	14.291	931
FEMAG	0.065	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.246	882
FEMGOV	0.039	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.193	881
FEMSEN	0.096	0.000	2.000	0.000	0.345	931
REGION (SOUTH)	0.306	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.461	931
REGION (NORTHEAST)	0.184	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.387	931
REGION_(WEST_)	0.265	0.000	1.000	0.000	0.442	931

[35] One interviewee, for instance, mentioned that the impetus for creating her organization came from the outrage she and her friends felt about the Clarence Thomas/Anita Hill Senate hearings in 1991.

4.28 – Variables Not Included

Most variables used in cross-sectional analysis can also be used in time-series analysis, provided that sufficient data exist for the desired range of years and geographical units. Unfortunately, if a particular variable has been estimated only once, it becomes problematic to include that variable in a time-series study because of the likelihood of colinearity with the dummy variables. Many cross-sectional studies have included a political culture variable, such as the trichotomous *traditionalistic-moralistic-individualistic* measure formulated by Elazar in 1966, or his updated measure from 1984. Likewise, cross-sectional studies have often included a measure of party strength, such the one developed by Mayhew (1986). There has never been an attempt to quantify changes in these variables over time, partly because they are somewhat subjective measures in the first place. Thus, there was no way to include political culture and party strength measures in this study. It is my hope that the other measures I have included in this study will approximate the effects of these time-invariant factors. Political culture, for instance, may be sufficiently approximated by ideology and the regional variables. Low turnover may reflect to increased party entrenchment and strength.

Other variables not included in this study are those for which data are unavailable on a yearly basis. A state's religious composition, for instance, is estimated decennially with the census, which is too large an interval to be of use in this study. David Niven (1998) indicated that the gender of the local party leaders makes a difference in female recruitment, but there is no estimation of

gender ratios in party leadership beyond his single-year survey. Arceneaux (2001) developed a "feminism index," a measure independent from ideology and political culture. Unfortunately, his index is limited to 38 states and the years 1973-1995, making it undesirable to include in this wider-reaching study. Once again, it is my hope that these variables will be approximated by a combination of other control and dummy variables included in this study.

Additionally, this study does not include a variable for multi-member districts. Richardson and Cooper (2003) conducted a study similar in format to this one, and did not find significance for multimember districts.[36]

4.3 – Model Outlines

There are several independent and dependent variables available in this study, so the number of independent/dependent combinations is quite large. Further complicating matters are questions of which dummy variables to use (state vs. region), what time lag is appropriate, and whether to use the conservative or liberal estimates for the variables EDUCATION, LOWPAYLONGSESSION, and ORGTOTAL. (Recall from section 4.21 that there were some states for which organization data were uncertain). For the most part, these questions can be resolved by performing a preliminary analysis to determine what works best. State dummy variables, for instance, may be unnecessary if other variables have sufficiently controlled for each state's

[36] Had I been able to acquire a satisfactory dataset for multimember districts (MMDs), I might have included this variable. It is possible that MMDs benefit women of one party and not another. However, the findings in Richardson and Cooper (2003) indicate that including a control for MMDs in this study is not explicitly necessary.

distinctive characteristics. Thus, the models set out in the following section are open-ended, representing a general approach rather than a rigid combination of variables.

Because this study focuses on the efforts of women's organizations, each model will employ a particular organization-related independent variable (such as ORGTOTAL). The dependent variables (such as FEM%OFTOTAL) will be rotated in and out, so that each model will actually comprise multiple "trials." The test of interest in each trial is whether the model's key independent variable achieves significance against the dependent variable of the particular trial. All models use linear regression (see section 4.4 for equation specifics).

Model 1 - ORGTOTAL

The key independent variable of Model 1 is ORGTOTAL, which represents the total number of organizations present for each state-year of the study. The first trial will measure ORGTOTAL against the dependent variable FEM%OFTOTAL. The subsequent trials will use partisan dependent variables to determine if ORGTOTAL has differing effects for Republicans and Democrats.

Model 2 - NPORG

The key independent variable of Model 2 is NPORG, which excludes all organizations with an explicitly partisan agenda. This model will also use both FEM%OFTOTAL and the partisan dependent variables in its trials, since the

nonpartisan/bipartisan organizations should have an effect on women of either party.

Model 3 – REPORG

In Model 3, the key independent variable is REPORG, the measure of Republican organizations. As the number of Republican organizations in this study was minimal, it is not expected that REPORG will achieve significance, even when measured against a Republican dependent variable.

Model 4 - DEMORG

The key independent variable of Model 4 is DEMORG. Democratic organizations were more plentiful than Republican organizations, so this model is more likely to produce significant results. FEM%OFTOTAL, DEM%OFDEM, and DEM%OFTOTAL will be used as dependent variables in the trials. Additionally, I will run a trial with a Republican dependent variable to determine what kinds of effects (positive, negative, or neutral) Democratic women's organizations have on Republican women in the competitive world of politics.

Model 5 - FUND

Model 5 and Model 6 concern particular activities performed by women's political organizations. The key independent variable of Model 5 is FUND, which is the number of women's organizations that provided funding in each state-year.

This category skewed heavily towards the Democrats and may only have an effect on the Democratic dependent variables.

Model 6 - TRAIN

The key independent variable of Model 6 is TRAIN, which measures the activity of campaign training. Training was much less skewed toward the Democrats, and is likely to have a more evenly distributed effect.

4.4 – Equations

To determine the effects of women's organizations on female representation, this study employs multiple regression analysis with fixed-effects panel data.[37] Recall that Model 1 examines the effects of the full organization pool, using ORGTOTAL as the key independent variable. In the first run, FEM%OFTOTAL is used as the dependent variable. To test whether the presence of women's political recruitment organizations affects the percentage of House seats held by women, the following equation is estimated:

(1A) $$FEM\%OFTOTAL = \alpha + \beta(ORGTOTAL) + \psi' CONTROLS + \delta' YEAR + \gamma' GEOG + \varepsilon$$

In Equation (1A), total female representation, FEM%OFTOTAL is estimated to be a linear function of the presence of female recruitment organizations (ORGTOTAL). The term CONTROLS represents a vector of the

[37] See Stock and Watson (2003), Chapter 8.

many control variables, described above, that are known to affect female representation. Year dummy variables (YEAR) are also included to account for unobserved factors that change with time but not geography. Geographic dummy variables (GEOG) are included to account for unobserved factors that are unique to particular geographical areas but do not vary over time.[38] The error term in equation (1A), ε, includes all other unobserved factors affecting FEM%OFTOTAL. The constant term is represented by the coefficient α. Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) will be used to estimate the parameters in Model 1: α, β , ψ′, δ′, γ′, ε. In all models, heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are computed to measure statistical significance. (Stock and Watson 2003)

The second run of Model 1 will retain ORGTOTAL as the key independent variable, but will use DEM%OFDEM as the dependent variable. This way, we can see the effects of the full organization pool on Democratic women as a percent of all Democrats. Equation (1B) expresses this new arrangement:

(1B) $$DEM\%OFDEM = \alpha + \beta(ORGTOTAL) + \psi' CONTROLS + \delta' YEAR + \gamma' GEOG + \varepsilon$$

Further runs of Model 1 will substitute REP%OFREP, DEM%OFTOTAL, and REP%OFTOTAL on the left-hand side of the equation. The results of each run will be displayed together to give the total result of Model 1.

[38] These dummy variables can be either state-based or region-based. See section 5.2 for results of preliminary trials that show that regional dummy variables are preferable to state dummy variables.

Recall that in Model 2, the goal is to determine the effects of nonpartisan organizations specifically. The equations used for this model are parallel to those above, but use NPORG as the key independent variable. For instance, when looking at the effects of nonpartisan organizations on total female representation, the following equation is used:

$$\text{(2A)}\quad FEM\%OFTOTAL = \alpha + \beta(NPORG) + \psi' CONTROLS + \delta' YEAR + \gamma' GEOG + \varepsilon$$

Equation (2A) is identical to Equation (1A) with respect to control variables, dummies, and dependent variable, but the independent variable *NPORG* has replaced the original *ORGTOTAL*. In subsequent runs of Model 2, the other dependent variables (DEM%OFDEM, REP%OFREP, DEM%OFTOTAL, and REP%OFTOTAL) will be used in place of FEM%OFTOTAL on the left-hand side of the equation. The key independent variable will remain NPORG. Models 3-6 continue in this vein.

Systematically substituting one dependent variable for another lets us easily compare the results of each model's subordinate runs. Chapter 5 presents the results obtained from running the six models through the EViews econometric program.[39]

[39] EViews is similar to other popular statistics engines, such as SPSS, STATA, and SAS.

Chapter 5

Empirical Results

In this chapter, the hypotheses outlined in section 4.1 are confirmed through empirical analysis. Women's organizations in total have a positive effect on the percentage of state lower house seats held by women. Analyzing along partisan lines, however, reveals that only Democratic women benefit from the presence of these organizations. The effects are not significant for Republican women.

5.1 – Introduction to Results

In addition to a variety of control variables, this study uses several key independent variables (ORGTOTAL, DEMORG, REPORG, NPORG, FUND, and TRAIN), and several dependent variables (FEM%OFTOTAL, DEM%OFTOTAL, DEM%OFDEM, REP%OFTOTAL, REP%OFREP). There are also multiple options for the number of years to "lag" certain variables, as well as a choice between regional dummy variables or state-by-state dummies. These dimensions multiply to form a very large number of potential

combinations. I performed a series of preliminary trials to get a general feel for the results and determine what the best "base model" would be. I then used a more systematic approach to get the final numeric results reproduced in sections 5.3-5.7.

5.2 – Preliminary Run-throughs

5.21 - Region Versus State Dummy Variables

The fixed effects panel model I employed for this study requires dummy variables for geography; that is, variables that account for fixed unobserved factors that make each geographic unit unique and that are not controlled for by other variables. I ran two sets of models with region and state dummy variables. The results were substantively the same for the main variables of interest – the women's organization variables – in this study. Because of colinearity between the state dummy variables and some of the control variables, however, I determined that regional dummy variables were preferable to state dummies. The sum of the control variables, it seemed, was adequate to quantify the characteristics that made each state unique. Adding state dummy variables only caused problems of colinearity with several of the control variables found to be predictive in other studies. In particular, regional dummies allowed empirical testing of the LOWPAYLONGSESSION, RELATIVE SEATS, and EDUCATION control variables, which lost significance when the state dummy variables were used. Since I wanted to determine the effects of all control variables, and since the results for the key independent variables (ORGTOTAL,

etc.) were substantively the same regardless of the geography dummy variable, I chose to use the regional dummies in all models.

5.22 - Choosing a Time Lag

Choosing the appropriate time lag for the "base model" was less clear cut. I started with a two-year (one election cycle) lag and tried a variety of organization and dependent variable combinations. I then tried the same combinations with a four-year lag. These results were greater in magnitude and were and more often significant than those produced with a two-year lag. Though six- and eight-year lags were for the most part as fruitful as the four-year lag, I felt that four years was the best time lag to use in further trials. The point of using a lag in time-series analysis is to help determine causality. We want to know whether the presence of women's organizations today significantly affects the number of women legislators in the future (beyond what we would normally expect for the given state and year). Thus, we want to use a lag that is far enough ahead of the organization's efforts, but immediate enough to prevent too many unseen effects from confusing the results. A lag of four years (two election cycles) appears most appropriate for the task.

5.23 - Party Indices

To reiterate section 4.22, there are two ways of measuring the success of female Democrats and Republicans. One looks at women as a percent of their party, the other as a percent of all Representatives in the chamber, male and

female. In the initial trials, the former method produced the strongest results, likely because of the wider range of values seen in the variables DEM%OFDEM and REP%OFREP. I will use these variables as the standard partisan indices, unless the situation specifically calls for the other measures (DEM%OFTOTAL, REP%OFTOTAL).[40]

5.24 – Limited Versus Expanded Estimates

I developed an alternate dataset that excised the states for which I was less confident of my organizational information (see section 4.21). I also started the dataset in 1977 (to avoid using projected female education data for 1973-1976) and ended the dataset in 1999 (to avoid using filled-in data for LOWPAYLONGSESSION). The results of this conservative model did not differ greatly from the results for the larger dataset. I therefore felt confident enough to move ahead with the full set of 49 states from 1973-2003.

5.3 – Results for Organizations Overall

The first hypothesis of this study is that women's political recruitment organizations have a positive effect on the number of women in politics, measured here in the lower house of state legislatures. The second hypothesis is that because Democratic organizations outnumber Republican organizations, and because most of the nonpartisan organizations are pro-choice, women's organizations on the whole will help Democrats more than they help Republicans.

[40] See Appendix B for full results with all dependent-independent combinations.

Model 1 tests these hypotheses by using the variable ORGTOTAL as the key independent variable (lagged backwards by four years). Three runs are made with this model for each of three dependent variables: FEM%OFTOTAL, DEM%OFDEM, and REP%OFREP.

Table 5.3, printed below, shows the results of this OLS model.

Table 5.3

	MODEL 1 - ORGTOTAL[41]	DEPENDENT VARIABLES		
		FEM%OFTOTAL	DEM%OFDEM	REP%OFREP
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	**ORGTOTAL** (4-year lag)	0.97***	2.18***	-0.67
	DEMMARGIN	-0.01	-0.04***	0.06***
	TURNOVER	0.08***	0.10***	0.05**
	LOWPAYLONGSESSION	3.08***	3.11***	4.89***
	RELATIVE SEATS	0.53***	0.91***	0.28**
	IDEOLOGY (2-year lag)	0.07***	0.05*	0.08***
	EDUCATION	0.20***	0.26***	0.19***
	FEMAG (4-year lag)	2.00*	2.88**	1.23
	FEMGOV (4-year lag)	2.36**	3.45***	2.14
	FEMSEN (4-year lag)	2.88***	3.28***	0.16
	REGION (SOUTH)	-3.04***	-1.34	-6.02***
	REGION (NORTHEAST)	-1.58**	-1.18	-1.91**
	REGION (WEST)	3.11***	4.96***	3.19***
	CONSTANT	-4.98***	-6.82***	-3.63
	R-squared	0.66	0.66	0.41
	Adjusted R-squared	0.64	0.65	0.39
	N	784	784	784
	Joint F-test on Year Dummies	6.40***	3.20***	4.21***

*** p <.01 ** p<.05 * p<.10
Significance tests determined with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.

Observe the top entry in the FEM%OFTOTAL column of Table 5.3. This is the coefficient for ORGTOTAL estimated against the dependent variable

[41] The year dummy variables have been omitted from the tables presented in this chapter, but are included in the printouts in Appendix B. Each model summary presents the results of a joint test of significance on the year dummy variables.

FEM%OFTOTAL. In other words, this number represents the average effect of one organization on female representation in an average state house of representatives. Though ORGTOTAL's coefficient is small (.97), it is positive and highly significant, confirming the first hypothesis: women's political organizations have a positive effect on female representation. The magnitude is approximately a one percentage point (.97%) increase in total female representation. Put another way, starting a generic women's organization in State X today will lead to a one percentage point increase in female representation in four years, beyond whatever other increases would be expected based on the state's other characteristics.

For the second hypothesis, observe the top entries in the second and third columns of Table 5.3. When DEM%OFDEM is used as the dependent variable, ORGTOTAL achieves significance and is in the positive direction. When REP%OFREP is the dependent variable, ORGTOTAL is negative, but insignificant. As a whole, women's organizations help female Democrats and have no significant effect on female Republicans. For the most part, this confirms the second hypothesis. Organizational effects on Republicans were predicted to be lower than the effects on Democrats, but were not predicted to be wholly insignificant.

5.4 – Nonpartisan Organizations

The next step is to isolate the organizations by their partisan status. As there were far more Democratic organizations than Republican organizations in

the total, perhaps it was not altogether fair to measure ORGTOTAL against the Republican dependent variable. The variable NPORG, on the other hand, is the measure of organizations that are open to supporting women of either party. Table 5.4 displays the result of Model 2, which uses NPORG as the key independent variable.

Table 5.4

	MODEL 2 - NPORG	DEPENDENT VARIABLES		
		FEM%OFTOTAL	DEM%OFDEM	REP%OFREP
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	**NPORG** (4-year lag)	0.75**	1.50**	-0.45
	DEMMARGIN	-0.01	-0.04***	0.06***
	TURNOVER	0.08***	0.11***	0.05*
	LOWPAYLONGSESSION	2.95***	2.77***	4.99***
	RELATIVE SEATS	0.49***	0.82***	0.31**
	IDEOLOGY (2-year lag)	0.07***	0.05*	0.08***
	EDUCATION	.21***	0.28***	0.18***
	FEMAG (4-year lag)	1.82	2.41*	1.37
	FEMGOV (4-year lag)	2.58**	3.93***	1.99
	FEMSEN (4-year lag)	3.07***	3.73***	0.02
	REGION (SOUTH)	-3.14***	-1.57*	-5.95***
	REGION (NORTHEAST)	-1.55**	-1.09	-1.93**
	REGION (WEST)	3.06***	4.82***	3.24***
	CONSTANT	-5.20***	-7.43***	-3.43
	R-squared	0.66	0.66	0.41
	Adjusted R-squared	0.64	0.64	0.39
	N	784	784	784
	Joint F-test on Year Dummies	6.54***	3.45***	4.03***

*** p <.01 ** p<.05 * p<.10

Significance tests determined with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.

The results for NPORG were very similar to those for ORGTOTAL. Once again, using FEM%OFTOTAL and DEM%OFDEM as the dependent variables yields a significant and positive result for the independent variable (NPORG in this case). The relationship between nonpartisan organizations and

Republican women representatives was insignificant. This result is more surprising than the insignificant relationship found earlier between ORGTOTAL and REP%OFREP. It's true that the nonpartisan organizations were very often pro-choice and therefore Democratic-leaning, but it is surprising that they did not have even a small positive effect for Republican women. Even if the p-value had indicated significance, the relationship would be negative.[42]

5.5 – Partisan Organizations

Having analyzed the nonpartisan organizations, we now turn to those organizations that exclusively support women of a particular party. Because there were so few Republican organizations included in the study, I thought it unlikely that there would be a significant result for the variable REPORG. And indeed, REPORG was insignificant against all of the dependent variables. Table 5.51 shows the results for the most relevant indices (FEM%OFTOTAL, REP%OFREP, and REP%OFTOTAL). In this case, that the lack of significance is most likely due to the small number of observations, rather than some great failing on the part of the Republican women's organizations studied. (Disconcertingly, though, the coefficient is in the negative direction when REP%OFREP is the dependent variable).

[42] One of the few differences between the trials with state dummy variables and the trials with region dummy variables was that in the latter trials, NPORG *was* significant and negative for Republicans. In the competitive world of politics, helping one party much more than the other may have a deleterious (if unintended) effect on the excluded party.

Table 5.51

	MODEL 3 – REPORG	DEPENDENT VARIABLES		
		FEM%OFTOTAL	REP%OFREP	REP%OFTOTAL
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	**REPORG** (4-year lag)	0.75	-0.38	0.24
	DEMMARGIN	-0.01	0.06***	-0.06***
	TURNOVER	0.08***	0.05*	0.02*
	LOWPAYLONGSESSION	2.83***	5.06***	1.68***
	RELATIVE SEATS	0.43***	0.35***	0.20***
	IDEOLOGY (2-year lag)	0.08***	0.08***	-0.01
	EDUCATION	0.23***	0.17***	.04*
	FEMAG (4-year lag)	1.62	1.50	1.38**
	FEMGOV (4-year lag)	2.45**	2.05	1.51*
	FEMSEN (4-year lag)	3.08**	0.00	0.15
	REGION (SOUTH)	-3.13***	-5.95***	-1.96**
	REGION (NORTHEAST)	-1.51**	-1.96**	-0.34
	REGION (WEST)	2.91*	3.33***	1.26***
	CONSTANT	-5.68***	-3.14	3.13***
	R-squared	0.65	0.41	0.65
	Adjusted R-squared	0.64	0.39	0.63
	N	784	784	784
	Joint F-test on Year Dummies	7.85***	4.10***	4.08***

*** p <.01 ** p<.05 * p<.10

Significance tests determined with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.

On the Democratic side, there were many more organizations to observe. I ran trials using FEM%OFTOTAL and the two Democratic indices as dependent variables. Out of curiosity, I ran a trial with REP%OFREP as the dependent variable to see if Democratic organizations had any discernible effect on Republican women. The results are reproduced in Table 5.52.

Table 5.52

	MODEL 4 - DEMORG	DEPENDENT VARIABLES			
		FEM%OFTOT.	DEM%OFDEM	DEM%OFTOT.	REP%OFREP
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	**DEMORG** (4-year lag)	2.42***	6.21***	2.36***	-2.01**
	DEMMARGIN	-0.01	-0.04***	0.06***	0.06***
	TURNOVER	0.07***	0.10***	0.05***	0.05**
	LOWPAYLONGSESS	2.90***	2.73***	1.23**	5.00***
	RELATIVE SEATS	0.46***	0.77***	0.26***	0.32***
	IDEOLOGY (2-yr lag)	0.08***	0.05*	0.09***	0.08***
	EDUCATION	0.23***	0.31***	0.19***	0.17***
	FEMAG (4-year lag)	1.66	2.14	0.30	1.45
	FEMGOV (4-year lag)	2.32**	3.30**	0.79	2.19
	FEMSEN (4-year lag)	3.03***	3.58***	2.86***	0.07
	REGION (SOUTH)	-3.05***	-1.32	-1.08**	-6.04***
	REGION (NE)	-1.44**	-0.87	-1.11**	-2.01**
	REGION (WEST)	2.80***	4.24***	1.55***	3.41***
	CONSTANT	-5.34***	-7.51***	-8.49***	-3.42
	R-squared	0.66	0.67	0.60	0.41
	Adjusted R-squared	0.64	0.65	0.58	0.39
	N	784	784	784	784
	Joint F-test on Year Dummies	7.93***	4.03***	5.24***	4.06***

*** p <.01 ** p<.05 * p<.10

Significance tests determined with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.

Democratic organizations had a positive and significant effect on Democratic women. Moreover, the effect size is large relative to other organizational effects seen in this study. Democratic organizations are the real powerhouses of this study, producing the largest coefficients of all the models. Of course, the effect size is diminished when the dependent variable is switched to DEM%OFTOTAL (as opposed to the standard DEM%OFDEM). This makes intuitive sense. These potent organizations may help Democratic women make

real strides in their party, but the party itself is always going to have to share some percent of the House with the Republicans.

Republican women, who have not reaped significant benefits from organizations thus far, actually see a negative effect at the hands of the Democratic organizations. It is important to remember that these organizations operate in the world of competitive, zero-sum politics. By helping women of their own party, Democratic organizations actually hinder Republican women. Looking at the magnitude of the coefficients, though, Democratic organizations apparently help female Democrats more than they hurt female Republicans (positive 6.21 versus negative 2.01). This helps explain why DEMORG is still significant and positive when measured against FEM%OFTOTAL.

I also performed one trial that included NPORG, REPORG, and DEMORG as key independent variables to make sure I wasn't missing something by running these variables in separate models. The results for each organizational variable in that trial were nearly identical to the results obtained in their respective "solo" models.

5.6 – Funding and Training

The final set of organization-related variables concern two common activities performed by women's political organizations: funding and training. It should be noted once again that the variable FUND skews Democrat because of the many state-level EMILY's List copycats. Table 5.61 shows the results for Model 5.

Table 5.61

	MODEL 5 - FUND	DEPENDENT VARIABLES		
		FEM%OFTOTAL	DEM%OFDEM	REP%OFREP
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	**FUND** (4-year lag)	0.52	1.64***	-0.81
	DEMMARGIN	-0.01	-0.04***	0.06***
	TURNOVER	0.08***	0.11***	0.05*
	LOWPAYLONGSESSION	2.95***	2.96***	4.84***
	RELATIVE SEATS	0.45***	0.76***	0.32**
	IDEOLOGY (2-year lag)	0.07***	0.04	0.09***
	EDUCATION	0.22***	0.29***	0.18***
	FEMAG (4-year lag)	1.66	2.20*	1.38
	FEMGOV (4-year lag)	2.38**	3.35***	2.27
	FEMSEN (4-year lag)	3.07***	3.64***	0.10
	REGION (SOUTH)	-3.17**	-1.63*	-5.93***
	REGION (NORTHEAST)	-1.47**	-0.92	-2.00**
	REGION (WEST)	2.94***	4.63***	3.26***
	CONSTANT	-5.27***	-7.12***	-3.76*
	R-squared	0.65	0.66	0.41
	Adjusted R-squared	0.64	0.64	0.39
	N	784	784	784
	Joint F-test on Year Dummies	7.50***	3.86***	4.13***

*** p <.01 ** p<.05 * p<.10

Significance tests determined with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.

As expected, Democrats benefit from funding, while Republicans see no statistically significant effect. The coefficient is negative for Republicans, however, and was within striking distance of significance (p=.13). This may help explain why FUND did not achieve significance when FEM%OFTOTAL was the dependent variable.

Unlike the Democratic-leaning funding pool, organizations that provided campaign training were usually nonpartisan. Moreover, several training organizations were "issue-less" institutions associated with universities. Because of their relative neutrality on issues of partisanship and choice, I expected training

organizations to have a more even distribution of benefits. Table 5.62 shows the results for the independent variable TRAIN.

Table 5.62

	MODEL 6 - TRAIN	DEPENDENT VARIABLES			
		FEM%OFTOT	DEM%OFDEM	REP%OFREP	REP%OFTOT
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	**TRAIN** (4-year lag)	1.50***	2.04***	0.02	0.55**
	DEMMARGIN	-0.01	-0.04***	0.06***	-0.06***
	TURNOVER	0.08***	0.11***	0.05*	0.02*
	LOWPAYLONGSESS	3.03***	2.79***	5.09***	1.75***
	RELATIVE SEATS	0.46***	0.74***	0.35***	0.21***
	IDEOLOGY (2-yr lag)	0.07***	0.05*	0.08***	-0.02
	EDUCATION	0.22***	0.31***	0.16***	0.04
	FEMAG (4-year lag)	1.97*	2.46*	1.53	1.51**
	FEMGOV (4-year lag)	2.43**	3.71***	2.00	1.50*
	FEMSEN (4-year lag)	3.06***	3.79***	-0.04	0.14
	REGION (SOUTH)	-2.71***	-1.01	-5.93***	-1.80***
	REGION (NE)	-1.06	-0.39	-1.96**	-0.18
	REGION (WEST)	3.10***	4.75***	3.35***	1.33***
	CONSTANT	-5.32***	-7.88***	-3.16	3.27***
	R-squared	0.66	0.66	0.41	0.65
	Adjusted R-squared	0.65	0.64	0.39	0.64
	N	784	784	784	784
	Joint F-test on Year Dummies	7.07***	3.56***	3.99***	3.73***

*** p <.01 ** p<.05 * p<.10

Significance tests determined with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.

Efforts to train candidates positively affected female representation and even eclipse the effect sizes seen for funding. Turning to the partisan breakdown, we see that Democratic women are once again the primary beneficiaries of organizations' efforts. When using REP%OFREP as the dependent variable, TRAIN does not achieve significance. The sign, however, is positive. This is a change from the usual negative sign seen for Republicans in other models. Out of

curiosity, I tested TRAIN against the other Republican dependent variable, REP%OFTOTAL. For the first time, the organizational effects are both positive and significant for Republican women. Though the evidence is somewhat weaker because of the insignificant result in the REP%OFREP run, training is certainly closer to being bipartisan than other organizational efforts.

I also ran one trial that included both FUND and TRAIN as the key independent variables. The results of this trial were substantively the same as those in the models that dealt with FUND and TRAIN separately.

5.7 – Other Results: Control Variables

For the most part, the control variables used in this study were significant, though sometimes only for one of the two parties. Because each model involved a different key independent variable, the coefficients and p-values of the control variables shifted slightly with each run of the data. In some cases, this meant a change in the significance category (i.e. .01, .05, .1, or "insignificant") for a variable. The conclusions in the following section derive from overall impressions of the significance of the control variables, taking into account the occasionally varying results across the different models. For reference, the results from Model 2 (key independent variable NPORG) are reprinted in Table 5.7, but the reader is advised to review the results from all models.

Table 5.7 – Reference Model for Control Variable Results

	MODEL 2 - NPORG	DEPENDENT VARIABLES		
		FEM%OFTOTAL	DEM%OFDEM	REP%OFREP
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	**NPORG** (4-year lag)	0.75**	1.50**	-0.45
	DEMMARGIN	-0.01	-0.04***	0.06***
	TURNOVER	0.08***	0.11***	0.05*
	LOWPAYLONGSESSION	2.95***	2.77***	4.99***
	RELATIVE SEATS	0.49***	0.82***	0.31**
	IDEOLOGY (2-year lag)	0.07***	0.05*	0.08***
	EDUCATION	.21***	0.28***	0.18***
	FEMAG (4-year lag)	1.82	2.41*	1.37
	FEMGOV (4-year lag)	2.58**	3.93***	1.99
	FEMSEN (4-year lag)	3.07***	3.73***	0.02
	REGION (SOUTH)	-3.14***	-1.57*	-5.95***
	REGION (NORTHEAST)	-1.55**	-1.09	-1.93**
	REGION (WEST)	3.06***	4.82***	3.24***
	CONSTANT	-5.20***	-7.43***	-3.43
	R-squared	0.66	0.66	0.41
	Adjusted R-squared	0.64	0.64	0.39
	N	784	784	784
	Joint F-test on Year Dummies	6.54***	3.45***	4.03***

*** p <.01 ** p<.05 * p<.10

Significance tests determined with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.

DEMMARGIN

The variable DEMMARGIN was significant in all trials that involved partisan dependent variables (unsurprisingly, it was insignificant for the catch-all variable FEM%OFTOTAL). Moreover, the coefficient signs were always in the direction predicted by the "Democratic paradox." Higher (more Democrat-heavy) values for DEMMARGIN negatively correlated with the dependent variable DEM%OFDEM and positively correlated with REP%OFREP. In other words, women are likely to constitute a higher percentage of a minority party and a lower percentage of a majority party.

Of course, the total number of women in a majority party may be higher than the total number of women in the minority party, particularly when the partisan ratio is quite skewed. When using the dependent variable DEM%OFTOTAL (rather than DEM%OFDEM), the coefficient for DEMMARGIN was positive. As a percent of the whole chamber, Democratic women do better when the Democrats enjoy a large margin of control. In all cases, however, the absolute effect size was very small. It may be that changing party politics have diminished the effects of the Democratic paradox.

TURNOVER

Higher turnover correlated to higher numbers of women Representatives of both parties, though the significance was marginal (p=.05-.1) for Republicans. The effect size was always very small, though, indicating that turnover likely plays a smaller role than previous research suggests.

LOWPAYLONGSESSION

Sanbonmatsu (2002) found that only Republican women were positively affected by her dummy variable describing states with low legislative salary and long legislative session (the variable was insignificant for Democratic women). Using her same dummy variable, I find that "un-professionalized" legislatures correlate significantly to higher female representation in both parties, though the effect size is indeed larger for Republican women.

RELATIVESEATS

The variable RELATIVESEATS was a positive and significant predictor of female representation in either party. As predicted, states with a large number of seats per million residents (i.e. small district magnitude) elect more women on average than states with very large districts.

IDEOLOGY (2 year lag)

Interestingly, ideology was a more significant predictor for Republican women than for Democratic women, for whom there was only a marginally significant relationship. A more liberal (positive) ideology score corresponded to higher numbers for Republican women, perhaps because women are more often on the liberal end of their party's spectrum. IDEOLOGY was usually marginally significant for Democrats, and was also in the positive direction.

FEMSEN (4-year lag)

Female U.S. Senators have a positive effect on the number of women state Representatives in subsequent years. The presence of a female U.S. Senator today adds about three percentage points to female representation in lower houses four years from today. For instance, if a state whose house of representatives is 20% female elects a woman U.S. Senator, the house will go up to 23% female four years later (assuming, of course, that all other factors remain constant).

Breaking this down by party, however, we see that the effect is significant only for Democrats. FEMSEN was insignificant for Republican women.

These results both confirm and add nuance to my earlier findings in Showalter (2005), which did not differentiate by party. Prominent elected women, such as U.S. Senators, appear to act as a kind of recruitment tool in and of themselves. Like the recruitment organizations in this study, though, these women senators only significantly affect Democrats.

FEMGOV (4-year lag)

In Showalter (2005), I did not find a significant relationship between the presence of a female governor and increased female legislative representation. This study, which is superior in terms of control variables and methodology, does find a significant relationship. The presence of a female governor increases total female lower-house representation (FEM%OFTOTAL) by around two and one-half percentage points.

Turning to the partisan breakdown, the results once again indicate that the impact of female governors is limited to Democrats. When FEMGOV was measured against the Republican dependent variable REP%OFORG, the results were positive, but insignificant.

FEMAG (4-year lag)

The effects of female Attorneys General (AGs) on total female lower-house representation (FEM%OFTOTAL) were marginally significant in some

models, and insignificant in others. The relationship between the presence of female AGs and increased female legislative representation four years later is weak at best. This contradicts my earlier study, which did find a significant relationship. FEMAG was usually marginally significant against the Democratic dependent variable DEM%OFDEM, indicating another possible difference between the parties (FEMAG was never significant against the Republican dependent variable REP%OFREP).[43]

EDUCATION

Education was a significant correlate for both Democratic and Republican women. States with higher percentages of women with at least some college education correlated with increased female representation overall and within both parties.

REGION (SOUTH)

As predicted, Southern status was a negative correlate of overall female representation (FEM%OFTOTAL). Turning to the partisan trials, however, REGION (SOUTH) was only significant for Republicans; it was insignificant (or very marginally significant), though still negative, for Democrats. This discrepancy may have something to do with the dramatic change in Democrats' fortunes in the South during the time period studies. Democrats held

[43] Interestingly, FEMGOV and FEMAG did achieve significance when measured against the alternate Republican dependent variable REP%OFTOTAL. Even more surprisingly, FEMGOV and FEMAG did *not* achieve significance against the alternate Democratic dependent variable DEM%OFTOTAL. There may be some interplay here between partisan control and the effects of female governors and attorneys general.

supermajorities in all Southern states in the 1970s, but today are often a tiny minority.[44]

REGION (NORTHEAST)

The Northeast was also inhospitable to women, though to a lesser extent than the South. This finding confirms the characterization of the Northeast as stagnating after early success. Over the time period studied, women in the Northeast did not make the kinds of gains seen in other progressive regions. This may have much to do with party strength, as the Northeast is a region of strong, established parties with an entrenched set of incumbents. Like the dummy variable for the South, REGION (NORTHEAST) was significant for Republicans and insignificant for Democrats, though both had the expected negative coefficients.

REGION (WEST)

The West, as predicted, was a positive correlate of female representation. The variable was highly significant and positive for all women, regardless of party. The effect sizes are on par with those for the South, but in the opposite direction. Whether because of weak parties, progressive attitudes, or a residual egalitarian "pioneer spirit," the West is a great producer of women legislators, both Democrat and Republican.

[44] REGION (SOUTH) did achieve significance when measured against the alternate Democratic dependent variable DEM%OFTOTAL. This may also reflect the odd history of Democrats in Southern legislatures (see results for DEMMARGIN).

Chapter 6

Conclusions

6.1 – Interpreting the Results

This study found that women's political recruitment organizations have a positive, statistically significant effect on the percentage of state lower house seats held by women. Yet, the effects were distributed unevenly between the parties, likely reflecting the larger number of Democratic and pro-choice organizations in the total pool. The nonpartisan organizations, which included a large number of National Women's Political Caucus state chapters, helped Democratic women and had no significant effect on Republican women. With respect to partisan efforts, the small number of Republican organizations did not show a discernable effect, while the numerous Democratic organizations proved to be the most effective subset of the study. The Democratic organizations had a deleterious effect on Republican women, but, in terms of total female representation, more than made up the difference in Democratic gains. The organizational activity of providing funding only positively affected Democratic women, while organizations that

focused on training had a somewhat more even effect across the parties. Table 6.1 reproduces and summarizes the organizational effects seen in Models 1-6.

Table 6.1

		DEPENDENT VARIABLES				
		FEM%OF TOTAL	DEM% OFDEM	REP% OFREP	DEM%OF TOTAL	REP%OF TOTAL
ORGANIZATION VARIABLES	ORGTOTAL (4-yr lag)	0.97***	2.18***	-0.67	1.13***	-0.16
	NPORG (4-yr lag)	0.75**	1.50**	-0.45	1.03***	-0.28
	REPORG (4-yr lag)	0.75	1.61	-0.38	0.51	0.24
	DEMORG (4-yr lag)	2.42***	6.21***	-2.01**	2.36***	0.06
	FUND (4-yr lag)	0.52	1.64***	-0.81	0.68***	-0.16
	TRAIN (4-yr lag)	1.50***	2.04***	0.02	0.55**	0.94***
	N	784	784	784	784	784

*** p <.01 ** p<.05 * p<.10
Significance tests determined with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.

To illustrate the numbers displayed above, it is useful to think of an imaginary average State X. Let us say that State X has 100 total members in its House of Representatives, 50 Republicans and 50 Democrats. Let us also say that each party has 10 female members, totaling 20% of their respective party and 20% of the chamber overall. Suppose that a generic women's political recruitment organization has just started in State X. If all other factors remain constant, the number of female Representatives will go up by one (or .97% rounded to the nearest whole legislator) four years from now. This new female legislator will almost certainly be a Democrat.

Now let us suppose that a Democratic women's organization has just begun in State X. If all other factors remain constant, the number of female Democrats will go up by three (rounded from 6.21% of the Democratic delegation), while the number of female Republicans will go down by one (rounded from 2.01% of the Republican delegation). The net result will be two additional female representatives.

Of course, it is unlikely that all other factors will remain constant. If State X sees a sudden upsurge of liberalism, an influx of educated women, or an unusually high rate of turnover, there might be even more new women elected. If the legislature becomes more professionalized, or if there is a reduction in the number of legislative seats, it is likely that fewer women will be elected. However these conditions change, though, the effect of the recruitment organization will remain the same.

6.2 – Placing Organizations in Context

In terms of effect size, how do women's organizations measure up against the sociopolitical, institutional, and eligibility pool-related factors? Reviewing the tables from Chapter 5, the organizational effects generally fell somewhere in the middle of the pack. Though significant, the effect sizes for DEMMARGIN, TURNOVER, RELATIVE SEATS, IDEOLOGY, and EDUCATION were all smaller in magnitude than the organization effects. Because of the units in which they were entered (percentage points), these variables could conceivably play a larger role than their miniscule coefficients imply. Turnover, for instance, had a

typical effect size of about one-tenth of one percent, a number that in practical application is very small: a one-percentage-point increase in turnover in State X would yield an additional tenth of a female legislator. On the other hand, if turnover in State X were much higher than normal – say 60% rather than 20% - the additional 40 percentage points of turnover would multiply the .1% effect by 40, yielding four new female legislators.

Yet, giant spikes upwards or downwards in these control variables were atypical. In most scenarios, the magnitude of the effects of one organization will be larger than the effects of the aforementioned variables. Other control variables, though, had effect sizes larger than those seen for organizations. These factors included the regional dummy variables, the LOWPAYLONGSESSION dummy variable, and the lagged FEMGOV and FEMSEN variables.[45]

Might there be a way for women's organizations to harness the higher efficacy of these variables? Women's groups cannot change the region in which their state resides, though they can certainly have a hand in reshaping the common political cultures that make some regions (i.e. the South and Northeast) worse than others (i.e. the West) for female representation. This is a very abstract challenge, however. More tangibly, women's groups could argue against increased professionalization in their state's legislature on the grounds that unprofessionalized legislatures correlate with higher female representation. Yet, this approach would be counterintuitive to the goal of encouraging women to think of politics as an attractive career.

[45] As the FEMAG variable was less often significant, it will not be discussed here. But it appears that female attorneys general can, at least, have some positive effects on Democratic women.

The presence of prominent elected women, on the other hand, is not only something that women's groups can help change for the better, but is doubly beneficial to the cause of getting more women into politics. In my previous study, I argued that the women's political pipeline is not wholly linear, but actually has a cyclic element to it. (Showalter 2005) Women elected to high office, such as governor or U.S. Senator, appear to inspire other women to enter politics at lower levels, such as the legislature. I speculated that women's political recruitment organizations might be better off spending their resources helping just one woman get elected to a prominent statewide office. The benefits would be an increased number of women legislators in subsequent years, as well as the obvious boon of having a woman in high office (which is, after all, the ultimate goal of the women's pipeline).

The study presented in this thesis partially confirms my earlier speculation. In our ideal state X, a typical women's organization would increase the number of women Representatives by one, while the presence of a woman governor or U.S. Senator would increase the number of women legislative representatives by two and three, respectively (though once again, these effects are not equally distributed across the parties). The indirect recruitment power of a highly visible elected woman surpasses the direct recruitment power of a typical women's organization.

Yet, betting the farm on one gubernatorial or senatorial candidate is risky. With limited resources, women's organizations could find their contributions eclipsed by the myriad other groups and corporations that invest in high-stakes

statewide races. By focusing on municipalities and legislative districts, women's groups spread their risks and may have a comparatively larger influence over the outcome of the election. Training, which was a strong suit of the organizations studied, is also more appropriate for an entry-level audience.

Of course, an obvious answer is that women's organizations should support local, legislative, *and* statewide female candidates. And indeed, many of the organizations in this study did support candidates at all levels of state politics. Female congressional and gubernatorial candidates also have access to national women's groups not included in this study, such as EMILY's List and WISH List. An avenue of further research would be to explore the interaction between women's organizations (both state and national), female statewide officials, and female legislators.

6.3 – Implications for Women's Organizations

The results of this study confirm the importance and efficacy of women's political recruitment organizations. The prescriptions that women's groups can take from this study are not uniform, however, and depend entirely on their partisan status.

Democrats enjoy a wide range of possibilities. Predictably, funding is a proven winner. The "baby EMILY's List" format appears to be an effective one, as these funding groups dominated the highly successful Democratic organization pool. Likewise, training activities were an effective means of increasing the Democratic female representation. Finally, prominent elected women,

particularly U.S. Senators, had a significant positive effect on Democratic female representation that was not often seen on the Republican side. Democratic organizations therefore have a number of approaches for which they can expect a reasonable return on the time and money they invest.

The possibilities are narrower and less certain for Republicans. There were too few Republican women's organizations in this study to be able to reach firm conclusions regarding their efficacy. Funding had no significant effect on Republicans, though this was likely the result of a pool skewed toward Democratic groups. Training had only a questionable positive effect. Finally, Republican female representation did not generally respond significantly to the presence of prominent elected women, making a top-down approach a less surefire bet for Republican women's groups.[46] More research is needed in the area of Republican women and electoral politics. There may be alternate explanations for the success or failure of Republican women candidates. It is also possible that national Republican groups excluded from this study, such as WISH List and Winning Women, operate on a more local level than their Democratic counterparts (i.e. EMILY's List) and should have been counted for the states in which they were most active. This could be a fruitful avenue for further research.

Nonpartisan/bipartisan organizations, particularly those that are pro-choice, should accept that their efforts may only help women of the Democratic Party. This admission may not bother most organization leaders. Many of my interviewees from nonpartisan organizations said that their membership and

[46] FEMAG and FEMGOV did achieve moderate significance against the dependent variable REP%OFTOTAL, but were insignificant against REP%OFREP; FEMSEN was never significant.

leadership were mostly, if not wholly, Democratic. Those to whom it is important to help all women, regardless of party or issue-orientation, may need to seek a different approach from what has been typical thus far. An interesting subject of future research would be a comparison of pro-choice organizations with those that have no position on the abortion issue. The number of organizations that fit into this latter category is currently very small, but perhaps case study analysis could provide some insight.

6.4 – Directions for Future Research

There are promising possibilities for future research on the subject of state-level women's political recruitment organizations. As mentioned previously, Republican organizations and efforts need further investigation, as do organizations that do not espouse a pro-choice position. All the categories used in this study have the potential to be broken down further and analyzed for their differences. For instance, this study made no distinction between the large, single-event training conferences and the smaller, more intensive campaign schools. These subcategories of training might well produce different results under close scrutiny. The interaction of different activities, such as funding and training, would also be a useful subject of further research. An organization that offers both training *and* funding might prove more effective than the sum of two unrelated organizations, one offering training and the other offering funding.

A logical continuation of this study would be a cost-benefit analysis of the organizations and their efforts. If budget information could be obtained for each

organization, a determination could be made as to which types of efforts reap the most benefits per dollar spent. Democratic organizations produced larger effects than nonpartisan organizations, but it's always a possibility that, dollar-for-dollar, the nonpartisan organizations are more efficient. The intensive campaign schools might cost more per participant than the one-shot training conferences, but perhaps those participants will be exponentially more qualified and successful.

A final avenue of future research concerns the underlying conditions that cause women's organizations to arise in the first place. Do women's organizations crop up in response to the same conditions that favor increased female representation, or are organizations more likely to arise when conditions are especially *unfavorable* to female candidates? The states of New England, for instance, had a lower organizational presence than might be expected for such reputedly progressive states. Perhaps the early success women enjoyed in the New England states meant there was less impetus to create organizations to increase female representation. On the other hand, several Southern states were lacking in organizational presence for much of the study, even though their low female representation suggests potential for remedial efforts.

6.5 – Summary Conclusion

Women can only increase their representation in government if they choose to run for office. Though many factors influence women's likelihood of entering politics, state-level women's political recruitment organizations can and do play a significant role. The task of these organizations is to convince women

that they can succeed in, and be fulfilled by, a career in politics. When women do choose to run, organizations must support and nurture their candidacies if they are to have the best chance of winning on Election Day. After years of steady increases, progress is slowing down for female representation in state legislatures. It is up to women's political recruitment organizations to jumpstart this process once again, and to ensure that women's voices will be heard in the statehouse and beyond.

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Appendix A – List of State-Level Women's Political Recruitment Organizations

This appendix presents the list of organizations that was developed in the course of this study. Table 1 lists all organizations used in the empirical analysis described in Chapters 4 and 5. These 87 organizations are arranged by state in alphabetical order. Table 1 also describes the manner in which information was obtained for each organization. Table 2 lists the organizations that were excluded from the empirical analysis, their reasons for exclusion, and whether or not an interview was performed. Contact for all organizations is available upon request.

Table 1 – Organizations Included in the Empirical Analysis

State	Organization Name	Information Obtained Via:
Alabama	Alabama Women's Political Caucus (defunct)	Interview
Alabama	The Alabama Solution	Interview
Alabama	H.O.P.E. Chest	Interview
Alaska	Alaska Women's Political Caucus	Interview
Arizona	Arizona Women's Political Caucus	Interview
Arkansas	Arkansas Women's Political Caucus (defunct)	Interview
California	California List (Democrat)	Interview
California	California National Women's Political Caucus	Interview
California	Women's Political Committee	Interview
California	The Seneca Network (Republican)	Interview
Colorado	Colorado Women's Political Caucus (defunct)	NWPC Archives, Web
Colorado	Colorado Democratic Women's PAC	Interview
Connecticut	Connecticut Women's Political Caucus (defunct)	NWPC Archives, Web
Connecticut	Women Organizing Women PAC	Interview
Connecticut	Yale Women's Campaign School	Website, Email
Delaware	Delaware Women's Political Caucus (defunct)	Interview
Florida	Florida Women's Poltical Caucus	Interview
Florida	GWEN's List	Interview
Georgia	Georgia Women's Political Caucus	Interview
Georgia	Georgia's WIN List (Democrat)	Interview
Hawaii	Hawaii Women's Political Caucus	Interview
Idaho	Idaho Women's Political Caucus (defunct)	Interview
Idaho	Gracie's List	Interview
Idaho	Idaho Women's Network	Interview
Illinois	Republican Women's PAC of Illinois	Interview
Illinois	Lincoln Series	Website
Illinois	Illinois Women's Institute for Leadership (IWIL)	Interview
Illinois	Illinois Women's Political Caucus	Interview
Indiana	Indiana Women's Political Caucus (defunct)	Interview
Iowa	Iowa Women and Public Policy Group	Interview
Iowa	Iowa Women's Political Caucus (defunct)	Interview
Iowa	Dawn's List	Interview
Kansas	Kansas Women's Political Caucus (defunct)	NWPC Archives
Kentucky	Kentucky Women's Political Caucus	Interview
Louisiana	Louisiana Women's Political Caucus	Interview
Maine	Maine Women's Political Caucus (defunct)	NWPC Archives
Maryland	Academy of Leadership	Interview
Maryland	Maryland Women's Political Caucus (defunct)	Interview
Maryland	Harriet's List (Democrat)	Interview
Massachusetts	Massachussetts Women's Political Caucus	Interview
Michigan	Michigan Women's Campaign Fund	Interview
Michigan	Michigan Women's Political Caucus	Interview
Minnesota	Minnesota Women's Political Caucus	Email
Minnesota	Minnesota Women's Campaign Fund PAC	Website
Minnesota	Women Candidate Development Coalition	Interview

Missouri	Missouri Women's Action Fund	Interview
Missouri	Sue Shear Institute	Interview
Missouri	Win With Women	Interview
Missouri	Missouri Women's Political Caucus	Interview
Montana	Montana Women's Political Caucus (defunct)	Interview
Montana	Montana Women's Lobby	Interview
Montana	Montana Women's Campaign Network	Interview
Nevada	Nevada Women's Political Caucus (defunct)	Interview
New Jersey	The Christine Todd Whitman Excellence in Public Service Series (Republican)	Website
New Jersey	GROW Republican Women	Interview
New Jersey	PAM's List (Democrat)	Interview
New Jersey	Women's Political Caucus of New Jersey	Interview
New Jersey	Ready to Run	Interview
New Mexico	New Mexico Women's Political Caucus (defunct)	Interview
New York	The Eleanor Roosevelt Legacy Committee (Democrat)	Interview
New York	New York Women's Political Caucus	Interview
New York	Yale Women's Campaign School	Website, Email
North Carolina	North Carolina Women's Political Caucus (defunct)	Interview
North Carolina	Lillian's List (Democrat)	Interview
North Dakota	North Dakota Women's Political Caucus (defunct)	Interview
Ohio	Hope Chest (Democrat)	Website
Ohio	Ohio Women's Political Caucus (defunct)	Interview
Oklahoma	Oklahoma Women's Political Caucus (defunct)	Interview
Oregon	Oregon Women's Political Caucus	Interview
Oregon	Women's Investment Network (WIN-PAC)	Interview
Pennsylvania	Pennsylvania Women's Political Caucus	Interview
Rhode Island	Rhode Island Women's Political Caucus (defunct)	Interview
South Carolina	The B-List	Interview
South Dakota	South Dakota Women's Political Caucus (defunct)	Interview
Tennessee	Tennesee Women's Political Caucus	Interview
Tennessee	Women In Numbers (WIN)	Interview
Tennessee	Women Helping Achieve a Majority (WHAM)	Interview
Texas	Women Initiative PAC	Interview
Texas	Texas Women's Political Caucus	Interview
Utah	Utah Women's Political Caucus (defunct)	NWPC Archives, Web
Vermont	Vermont Women's Political Caucus (defunct)	NWPC Archives
Virginia	Sojourner 21 PAC (defunct)	Interview
Virginia	Virginia Women's Political Caucus	Interview
Washington	Washington Women's Political Caucus	Interview
West Virginia	West Virginia Women's Political Caucus (defunct)	Interview
Wisconsin	Wisconsin Women's Political Caucus	Interview
Wisconsin	Wisconsin Women's Choice	Interview
Wyoming	Wyoming Women's Political Caucus (defunct)	NWPC Archives

Table 2 – Organizations Not Included in Empirical Analysis

State	Organization Name	Interviewed	Why Excluded
Alabama	Alabama Women's Initiative	yes	Not focused on candidates
Arizona	EMERGE AZ	no	Too New
Arizona	Arizona List	yes	Too New
Arkansas	Arkansas Women's Action Fund	no	Unable to contact
California	Santa Barbara Women's Political Committee	no	Too local
California	Sacramento Women's Campaign Fund	no	Too local
California	Marin County Women's PAC	no	Too local
California	Los Angeles Women's Campaign Fund	no	Too local
California	Latina PAC	no	Narrow Focus
California	Hollywood Women's Political Committee	no	Too local
California	Los Angeles African American Women's PAC	no	Too local
California	Wednesday Committee (Los Angeles)	yes	Too local
California	Women For: give to men as well	no	Supports men
California	Women For: Orange County	no	Supports men
California	Women's Political Committee	no	Too local
California	HOPE-PAC	no	Narrow Focus
California	NWPCCA San Diego County	yes	Too local
California	EMERGE	yes	Too New
California	Eleanor Roosevelt Fund of California	no	Supports men
California	Democratic Activists for Women Now	no	Too local
California	California Women's Political Summit	yes	Not focused on candidates
California	Women's Political Fund (defunct)	no	Unable to contact
Delaware	Women's Democratic Club of Delaware PAC	yes	Supports men
Florida	Women's Political Caucus PAC: Broward County	no	Too local
Hawaii	Patsy T. Mink Political Action Committee	no	Too New
Indiana	Indiana Women's Political Network PAC	yes	Supports men
Kansas	Greater Kansas City Women's Political Caucus	yes	Too local
Louisiana	Committee of 21	yes	Too local
Louisiana	Women of Louisiana	no	Unable to contact
Maryland	Democratic Women's PAC Of Maryland, The	yes	Too New
Michigan	MI List	no	Too New
Minnesota	Minnesota $$ Million	no	Unable to contact
Mississippi	Mississippi Women's Political Caucus (defunct)	yes	Existed in name only
Missouri	St. Louis Women's Women's Political Caucus	yes	Too local
Missouri	Greater Kansas City Women's Political Caucus	yes	Too local
New Hampshire	New Hampshire Women's Political Caucus (defunct)	yes	Existed in name only
New Jersey	Women's Political Action Committee of New Jersey	no	Unable to contact
New York	Women's TAP Fund	yes	Too local
New York	NOW Alliance PAC - Long Island	yes	Supports men
North Carolina	Charlotte Women's Political Caucus	yes	Too local
North Carolina	Women's Leadership Institute	yes	Not focused on candidates
Ohio	Cincinnati Women's Political Caucus	yes	Too local
Ohio	Ohio NOW	yes	Supports men
Oklahoma	First Ladies of Oklahoma	yes	Supports men
Pennsylvania	PA Women's Campaign Fund	yes	Too local
Pennsylvania	Ain't I A Woman Network/PAC	no	Unable to contact
South Carolina	South Carolina Women's Political Caucus (defunct)	yes	Too local
South Dakota	South Dakota Advocacy Network for Women	yes	Not focused on candidates
Tennessee	Nashville Women's Political Caucus	yes	Too local
Texas	Annie's List	no	Too New
Texas	Task Force 2000 PAC	yes	Too local

APPENDIX B – Full Results for Models 1-6

This appendix presents the full results for each run of each model, as obtained using the EViews econometric program. These tables include the results for the year dummy variables, which were not displayed in Chapter 5. The tables also provide the standard error, t-statistic, f-statistic, and other descriptors of each trial. The tables are displayed in the following order:

Model 1	Key Independent Variable	Dependent Variable
Table 1A	ORGTOTAL	FEM%OFTOTAL
Table 1B	ORGTOTAL	DEM%OFDEM
Table 1C	ORGTOTAL	REP%OFREP
Table 1D	ORGTOTAL	DEM%OFTOTAL
Table 1E	ORGTOTAL	REP%OFTOTAL

Model 2	Key Independent Variable	Dependent Variable
Table 2A	NPORG	FEM%OFTOTAL
Table 2B	NPORG	DEM%OFDEM
Table 2C	NPORG	REP%OFREP
Table 2D	NPORG	DEM%OFTOTAL
Table 2E	NPORG	REP%OFTOTAL

Model 3	Key Independent Variable	Dependent Variable
Table 3A	REPORG	FEM%OFTOTAL
Table 3B	REPORG	DEM%OFDEM
Table 3C	REPORG	REP%OFREP
Table 3D	REPORG	DEM%OFTOTAL
Table 3E	REPORG	REP%OFTOTAL

Model 4	Key Independent Variable	Dependent Variable
Table 4A	DEMORG	FEM%OFTOTAL
Table 4B	DEMORG	DEM%OFDEM
Table 4C	DEMORG	REP%OFREP
Table 4D	DEMORG	DEM%OFTOTAL
Table 4E	DEMORG	REP%OFTOTAL

Model 5	Key Independent Variable	Dependent Variable
Table 5A	FUND	FEM%OFTOTAL
Table 5B	FUND	DEM%OFDEM
Table 5C	FUND	REP%OFREP
Table 5D	FUND	DEM%OFTOTAL
Table 5E	FUND	REP%OFTOTAL

Model 6	Key Independent Variable	Dependent Variable
Table 6A	TRAIN	FEM%OFTOTAL
Table 6B	TRAIN	DEM%OFDEM
Table 6C	TRAIN	REP%OFREP
Table 6D	TRAIN	DEM%OFTOTAL
Table 6E	TRAIN	REP%OFTOTAL

OTHER	Key Independent Variables	Dependent Variable
Table 7A	NPORG, REPORG, DEMORG	FEM%OFTOTAL
Table 7B	NPORG, REPORG, DEMORG	DEM%OFDEM
Table 7C	FUND, TRAIN	FEM%OFTOTAL

Table 1A

Dependent Variable: FEM_OFTOTAL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 09:49
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.049827	0.016186	-3.078407	0.0022
ORGTOTAL(-98)	0.009677	0.003286	2.945294	0.0033
DEMMARGIN	-0.006291	0.007205	-0.873164	0.3829
TURNOVER	0.000756	0.000184	4.109249	0.0000
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.030789	0.009069	3.394911	0.0007
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.005280	0.000992	5.324250	0.0000
IDEOLOGY(-49)	0.000735	0.000193	3.815411	0.0001
COLPCT2	0.204468	0.047622	4.293522	0.0000
FEMAG(-98)	0.019998	0.012265	1.630533	0.1034
FEMGOV(-98)	0.023573	0.011499	2.050044	0.0407
FEMSEN(-98)	0.028773	0.007672	3.750571	0.0002
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.030376	0.006396	-4.748914	0.0000
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.015756	0.006663	-2.364766	0.0183
REGION__WEST_	0.031066	0.006678	4.652258	0.0000
Y75	0.025415	0.008604	2.953878	0.0032
Y77	0.028718	0.009874	2.908540	0.0037
Y79	0.040483	0.009688	4.178810	0.0000
Y81	0.059573	0.010614	5.612834	0.0000
Y83	0.063340	0.010182	6.220775	0.0000
Y85	0.073050	0.011121	6.568729	0.0000
Y87	0.079429	0.011924	6.661110	0.0000
Y89	0.083554	0.012326	6.778470	0.0000
Y91	0.090934	0.012780	7.115317	0.0000
Y93	0.097554	0.012975	7.518408	0.0000
Y95	0.093842	0.015022	6.246802	0.0000
Y97	0.099078	0.015737	6.295756	0.0000
Y99	0.105896	0.016752	6.321475	0.0000
Y01	0.093075	0.017747	5.244555	0.0000
Y03	0.082057	0.016597	4.944186	0.0000

R-squared	0.657239	Mean dependent var	0.170133
Adjusted R-squared	0.644511	S.D. dependent var	0.090281
S.E. of regression	0.053828	Akaike info criterion	-2.969711
Sum squared resid	2.184683	Schwarz criterion	-2.797002
Log likelihood	1191.642	F-statistic	51.63516
Durbin-Watson stat	2.072486	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 1B
Dependent Variable: DEM_OFDEM
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 09:56
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.068191	0.020913	-3.260704	0.0012
ORGTOTAL(-98)	0.021768	0.004221	5.156672	0.0000
DEMMARGIN	-0.037940	0.009983	-3.800635	0.0002
TURNOVER	0.001005	0.000235	4.278867	0.0000
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.031071	0.009527	3.261525	0.0012
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.009143	0.001052	8.692886	0.0000
IDEOLOGY(-49)	0.000452	0.000268	1.686639	0.0921
COLPCT2	0.260084	0.058487	4.446828	0.0000
FEMAG(-98)	0.028765	0.013646	2.107971	0.0354
FEMGOV(-98)	0.034457	0.013762	2.503758	0.0125
FEMSEN(-98)	0.032847	0.007180	4.574491	0.0000
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.013413	0.009109	-1.472470	0.1413
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.011762	0.008706	-1.350989	0.1771
REGION__WEST_	0.049614	0.008613	5.760340	0.0000
Y75	0.027952	0.009529	2.933504	0.0035
Y77	0.019298	0.011248	1.715673	0.0866
Y79	0.026329	0.012065	2.182247	0.0294
Y81	0.051035	0.013073	3.903948	0.0001
Y83	0.048111	0.012466	3.859463	0.0001
Y85	0.066241	0.016125	4.108102	0.0000
Y87	0.070343	0.014110	4.985205	0.0000
Y89	0.073893	0.014571	5.071276	0.0000
Y91	0.079116	0.015556	5.085948	0.0000
Y93	0.085742	0.016614	5.160848	0.0000
Y95	0.090465	0.020699	4.370403	0.0000
Y97	0.095718	0.018409	5.199611	0.0000
Y99	0.112837	0.020420	5.525824	0.0000
Y01	0.101013	0.021004	4.809148	0.0000
Y03	0.097070	0.021251	4.567790	0.0000

R-squared	0.663092	Mean dependent var	0.186386
Adjusted R-squared	0.650581	S.D. dependent var	0.116915
S.E. of regression	0.069111	Akaike info criterion	-2.469886
Sum squared resid	3.601303	Schwarz criterion	-2.297177
Log likelihood	995.9603	F-statistic	53.00010
Durbin-Watson stat	2.045356	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 1C
Dependent Variable: REP_OFREP
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 09:57
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.036255	0.022568	-1.606524	0.1086
ORGTOTAL(-98)	-0.006702	0.004719	-1.420173	0.1560
DEMMARGIN	0.057641	0.011851	4.863874	0.0000
TURNOVER	0.000517	0.000263	1.969003	0.0493
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.048852	0.012939	3.775479	0.0002
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.002804	0.001394	2.011000	0.0447
IDEOLOGY(-49)	0.000847	0.000269	3.143079	0.0017
COLPCT2	0.185830	0.062477	2.974384	0.0030
FEMAG(-98)	0.012273	0.012501	0.981704	0.3266
FEMGOV(-98)	0.021360	0.015120	1.412760	0.1581
FEMSEN(-98)	0.001551	0.012401	0.125107	0.9005
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.060244	0.008539	-7.054860	0.0000
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.019081	0.008948	-2.132390	0.0333
REGION__WEST_	0.031901	0.008794	3.627540	0.0003
Y75	0.032541	0.017499	1.859589	0.0633
Y77	0.042570	0.016767	2.538974	0.0113
Y79	0.067972	0.015025	4.524032	0.0000
Y81	0.076444	0.014886	5.135212	0.0000
Y83	0.079995	0.015571	5.137549	0.0000
Y85	0.084019	0.016011	5.247731	0.0000
Y87	0.080550	0.016803	4.793694	0.0000
Y89	0.085429	0.016837	5.073917	0.0000
Y91	0.102658	0.017374	5.908813	0.0000
Y93	0.106490	0.018566	5.735717	0.0000
Y95	0.107128	0.020082	5.334398	0.0000
Y97	0.103671	0.020900	4.960261	0.0000
Y99	0.108814	0.021542	5.051267	0.0000
Y01	0.092251	0.022466	4.106142	0.0000
Y03	0.079657	0.022447	3.548637	0.0004

R-squared	0.408968	Mean dependent var	0.165276
Adjusted R-squared	0.387020	S.D. dependent var	0.098046
S.E. of regression	0.076764	Akaike info criterion	-2.259840
Sum squared resid	4.443050	Schwarz criterion	-2.087132
Log likelihood	913.7276	F-statistic	18.63336
Durbin-Watson stat	1.998048	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 1D

Dependent Variable: DEM_OFTOTAL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 09:57
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.080159	0.010774	-7.440225	0.0000
ORGTOTAL(-98)	0.011266	0.002165	5.203320	0.0000
DEMMARGIN	0.057500	0.005498	10.45885	0.0000
TURNOVER	0.000552	0.000128	4.325228	0.0000
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.014598	0.006010	2.428955	0.0154
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.003466	0.000565	6.131077	0.0000
IDEOLOGY(-49)	0.000870	0.000143	6.089947	0.0000
COLPCT2	0.157826	0.032700	4.826399	0.0000
FEMAG(-98)	0.007085	0.007637	0.927730	0.3538
FEMGOV(-98)	0.007816	0.006932	1.127592	0.2599
FEMSEN(-98)	0.026584	0.004208	6.317508	0.0000
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.010447	0.004694	-2.225474	0.0263
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.012532	0.004949	-2.532289	0.0115
REGION__WEST_	0.018869	0.004624	4.080180	0.0000
Y75	0.010359	0.006085	1.702412	0.0891
Y77	0.007984	0.006672	1.196591	0.2318
Y79	0.017087	0.006824	2.503818	0.0125
Y81	0.032257	0.007312	4.411768	0.0000
Y83	0.031534	0.007042	4.478259	0.0000
Y85	0.035131	0.008174	4.297689	0.0000
Y87	0.041995	0.008057	5.212101	0.0000
Y89	0.041021	0.008508	4.821760	0.0000
Y91	0.046616	0.009029	5.162960	0.0000
Y93	0.052295	0.009474	5.519680	0.0000
Y95	0.044671	0.010681	4.182412	0.0000
Y97	0.054198	0.010752	5.040765	0.0000
Y99	0.059451	0.011706	5.078801	0.0000
Y01	0.049842	0.012087	4.123618	0.0000
Y03	0.044955	0.011546	3.893364	0.0001

R-squared	0.601918	Mean dependent var	0.098193
Adjusted R-squared	0.587135	S.D. dependent var	0.056478
S.E. of regression	0.036290	Akaike info criterion	-3.758238
Sum squared resid	0.992969	Schwarz criterion	-3.585529
Log likelihood	1500.350	F-statistic	40.71716
Durbin-Watson stat	1.970436	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 1E
Dependent Variable: REP_OFTOTAL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 09:58
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0.030332	0.009619	3.153519	0.0017
ORGTOTAL(-98)	-0.001589	0.002047	-0.776215	0.4379
DEMMARGIN	-0.063791	0.004228	-15.08704	0.0000
TURNOVER	0.000205	0.000107	1.911375	0.0563
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.016192	0.005206	3.110234	0.0019
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.001815	0.000634	2.863667	0.0043
IDEOLOGY(-49)	-0.000135	9.97E-05	-1.356465	0.1754
COLPCT2	0.046642	0.025806	1.807396	0.0711
FEMAG(-98)	0.012913	0.006592	1.958923	0.0505
FEMGOV(-98)	0.015757	0.007676	2.052839	0.0404
FEMSEN(-98)	0.002189	0.004904	0.446397	0.6554
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.019929	0.003589	-5.552475	0.0000
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.003224	0.003698	-0.871782	0.3836
REGION__WEST_	0.012198	0.003957	3.082657	0.0021
Y75	0.015056	0.006040	2.492890	0.0129
Y77	0.020734	0.006460	3.209782	0.0014
Y79	0.023396	0.006395	3.658510	0.0003
Y81	0.027316	0.006660	4.101456	0.0000
Y83	0.031806	0.006507	4.888086	0.0000
Y85	0.037919	0.007205	5.262762	0.0000
Y87	0.037434	0.007576	4.940961	0.0000
Y89	0.042533	0.007560	5.625851	0.0000
Y91	0.044318	0.007614	5.820661	0.0000
Y93	0.045260	0.007974	5.676156	0.0000
Y95	0.049172	0.008945	5.496879	0.0000
Y97	0.044881	0.009812	4.574091	0.0000
Y99	0.046445	0.009846	4.717152	0.0000
Y01	0.043233	0.010234	4.224589	0.0000
Y03	0.037103	0.010108	3.670543	0.0003

R-squared	0.647594	Mean dependent var	0.071940
Adjusted R-squared	0.634507	S.D. dependent var	0.052930
S.E. of regression	0.031999	Akaike info criterion	-4.009885
Sum squared resid	0.772052	Schwarz criterion	-3.837176
Log likelihood	1598.870	F-statistic	49.48487
Durbin-Watson stat	2.060386	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 2A

Dependent Variable: FEM_OFTOTAL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 10:15
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.052042	0.016300	-3.192726	0.0015
NPORG(-98)	0.007490	0.003865	1.938259	0.0530
DEMMARGIN	-0.006154	0.007226	-0.851727	0.3946
TURNOVER	0.000791	0.000183	4.317608	0.0000
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.029463	0.009126	3.228312	0.0013
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.004907	0.001000	4.908436	0.0000
IDEOLOGY(-49)	0.000747	0.000194	3.843385	0.0001
COLPCT2	0.211921	0.048236	4.393381	0.0000
FEMAG(-98)	0.018211	0.012208	1.491684	0.1362
FEMGOV(-98)	0.025760	0.010888	2.365811	0.0182
FEMSEN(-98)	0.030671	0.007605	4.032903	0.0001
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.031365	0.006435	-4.873983	0.0000
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.015457	0.006703	-2.305996	0.0214
REGION__WEST_	0.030640	0.006694	4.577275	0.0000
Y75	0.025505	0.008683	2.937308	0.0034
Y77	0.030455	0.010002	3.044750	0.0024
Y79	0.042114	0.009782	4.305424	0.0000
Y81	0.061427	0.010648	5.768843	0.0000
Y83	0.065135	0.010208	6.380490	0.0000
Y85	0.074881	0.011126	6.730404	0.0000
Y87	0.081201	0.011898	6.824904	0.0000
Y89	0.085298	0.012266	6.953784	0.0000
Y91	0.092448	0.012700	7.279116	0.0000
Y93	0.098790	0.012983	7.609104	0.0000
Y95	0.095399	0.014945	6.383495	0.0000
Y97	0.101984	0.015629	6.525441	0.0000
Y99	0.108537	0.016595	6.540197	0.0000
Y01	0.096068	0.017629	5.449436	0.0000
Y03	0.084957	0.016699	5.087515	0.0000

R-squared	0.655052	Mean dependent var	0.170133
Adjusted R-squared	0.642243	S.D. dependent var	0.090281
S.E. of regression	0.053999	Akaike info criterion	-2.963352
Sum squared resid	2.198620	Schwarz criterion	-2.790643
Log likelihood	1189.152	F-statistic	51.13713
Durbin-Watson stat	2.068198	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 2B
Dependent Variable: DEM_OFDEM
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 10:16
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.074271	0.021105	-3.519134	0.0005
NPORG(-98)	0.015026	0.004914	3.057772	0.0023
DEMMARGIN	-0.037533	0.010097	-3.717230	0.0002
TURNOVER	0.001088	0.000238	4.571506	0.0000
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.027718	0.009580	2.893294	0.0039
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.008151	0.001069	7.625009	0.0000
IDEOLOGY(-49)	0.000485	0.000272	1.784982	0.0747
COLPCT2	0.281914	0.059660	4.725365	0.0000
FEMAG(-98)	0.024123	0.013610	1.772450	0.0767
FEMGOV(-98)	0.039318	0.013059	3.010816	0.0027
FEMSEN(-98)	0.037343	0.007415	5.036079	0.0000
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.015706	0.009264	-1.695299	0.0904
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.010947	0.008868	-1.234516	0.2174
REGION__WEST_	0.048222	0.008705	5.539248	0.0000
Y75	0.028180	0.009605	2.933778	0.0035
Y77	0.024467	0.011392	2.147804	0.0320
Y79	0.031204	0.012194	2.558915	0.0107
Y81	0.056507	0.013076	4.321471	0.0000
Y83	0.053355	0.012525	4.259994	0.0000
Y85	0.071431	0.016151	4.422692	0.0000
Y87	0.075382	0.014141	5.330595	0.0000
Y89	0.078840	0.014605	5.398282	0.0000
Y91	0.083303	0.015453	5.390705	0.0000
Y93	0.089126	0.016824	5.297524	0.0000
Y95	0.094430	0.020857	4.527399	0.0000
Y97	0.102675	0.018536	5.539119	0.0000
Y99	0.118968	0.020468	5.812295	0.0000
Y01	0.107759	0.021197	5.083801	0.0000
Y03	0.103434	0.021751	4.755423	0.0000

R-squared	0.655582	Mean dependent var	0.186386
Adjusted R-squared	0.642792	S.D. dependent var	0.116915
S.E. of regression	0.069877	Akaike info criterion	-2.447840
Sum squared resid	3.681580	Schwarz criterion	-2.275131
Log likelihood	987.3292	F-statistic	51.25725
Durbin-Watson stat	2.043548	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 2C
Dependent Variable: REP_OFREP
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 10:17
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.034322	0.022525	-1.523739	0.1280
NPORG(-98)	-0.004524	0.005582	-0.810575	0.4179
DEMMARGIN	0.057510	0.011888	4.837444	0.0000
TURNOVER	0.000491	0.000262	1.877389	0.0609
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.049905	0.012876	3.875783	0.0001
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.003118	0.001361	2.290352	0.0223
IDEOLOGY(-49)	0.000836	0.000270	3.103192	0.0020
COLPCT2	0.178826	0.063557	2.813604	0.0050
FEMAG(-98)	0.013736	0.012493	1.099549	0.2719
FEMGOV(-98)	0.019867	0.015559	1.276910	0.2020
FEMSEN(-98)	0.000155	0.012677	0.012189	0.9903
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.059534	0.008516	-6.990925	0.0000
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.019339	0.008935	-2.164506	0.0307
REGION__WEST_	0.032354	0.008933	3.621776	0.0003
Y75	0.032470	0.017451	1.860664	0.0632
Y77	0.040908	0.016811	2.433330	0.0152
Y79	0.066403	0.015115	4.393231	0.0000
Y81	0.074686	0.014965	4.990862	0.0000
Y83	0.078313	0.015582	5.025959	0.0000
Y85	0.082361	0.016003	5.146781	0.0000
Y87	0.078940	0.016791	4.701260	0.0000
Y89	0.083848	0.016811	4.987611	0.0000
Y91	0.101325	0.017341	5.843112	0.0000
Y93	0.105415	0.018578	5.674158	0.0000
Y95	0.105881	0.020150	5.254545	0.0000
Y97	0.101505	0.020896	4.857712	0.0000
Y99	0.106916	0.021612	4.947164	0.0000
Y01	0.090173	0.022656	3.980100	0.0001
Y03	0.077706	0.022641	3.432124	0.0006

R-squared	0.407935	Mean dependent var	0.165276
Adjusted R-squared	0.385948	S.D. dependent var	0.098046
S.E. of regression	0.076831	Akaike info criterion	-2.258094
Sum squared resid	4.450816	Schwarz criterion	-2.085385
Log likelihood	913.0438	F-statistic	18.55386
Durbin-Watson stat	2.000772	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 2D
Dependent Variable: DEM_OFTOTAL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 10:18
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.081793	0.010814	-7.563752	0.0000
NPORG(-98)	0.010289	0.002674	3.848242	0.0001
DEMMARGIN	0.057573	0.005521	10.42741	0.0000
TURNOVER	0.000587	0.000128	4.597526	0.0000
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.013371	0.006015	2.223168	0.0265
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.003161	0.000584	5.413553	0.0000
IDEOLOGY(-49)	0.000879	0.000144	6.084382	0.0000
COLPCT2	0.162149	0.033258	4.875456	0.0000
FEMAG(-98)	0.005538	0.007614	0.727363	0.4672
FEMGOV(-98)	0.010412	0.006551	1.589405	0.1124
FEMSEN(-98)	0.028600	0.004386	6.520151	0.0000
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.011539	0.004759	-2.424622	0.0156
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.012307	0.005000	-2.461314	0.0141
REGION__WEST_	0.018743	0.004678	4.006844	0.0001
Y75	0.010443	0.006111	1.708737	0.0879
Y77	0.008921	0.006799	1.312003	0.1899
Y79	0.017948	0.006915	2.595355	0.0096
Y81	0.033297	0.007335	4.539692	0.0000
Y83	0.032586	0.007052	4.620599	0.0000
Y85	0.036342	0.008168	4.449190	0.0000
Y87	0.043151	0.008053	5.358507	0.0000
Y89	0.042169	0.008490	4.966768	0.0000
Y91	0.047706	0.008985	5.309707	0.0000
Y93	0.053216	0.009531	5.583613	0.0000
Y95	0.046085	0.010714	4.301239	0.0000
Y97	0.057217	0.010704	5.345663	0.0000
Y99	0.062364	0.011627	5.363642	0.0000
Y01	0.053315	0.011990	4.446699	0.0000
Y03	0.048468	0.011664	4.155139	0.0000

R-squared	0.596349	Mean dependent var	0.098193
Adjusted R-squared	0.581359	S.D. dependent var	0.056478
S.E. of regression	0.036543	Akaike info criterion	-3.744346
Sum squared resid	1.006859	Schwarz criterion	-3.571637
Log likelihood	1494.911	F-statistic	39.78391
Durbin-Watson stat	1.972559	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 2E
Dependent Variable: REP_OFTOTAL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 10:19
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0.029752	0.009610	3.095838	0.0020
NPORG(-98)	-0.002798	0.002269	-1.233226	0.2179
DEMMARGIN	-0.063727	0.004233	-15.05593	0.0000
TURNOVER	0.000203	0.000107	1.906360	0.0570
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.016092	0.005233	3.074934	0.0022
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.001745	0.000620	2.813351	0.0050
IDEOLOGY(-49)	-0.000132	9.97E-05	-1.322182	0.1865
COLPCT2	0.049772	0.026081	1.908388	0.0567
FEMAG(-98)	0.012673	0.006489	1.953039	0.0512
FEMGOV(-98)	0.015348	0.007729	1.985743	0.0474
FEMSEN(-98)	0.002071	0.004925	0.420625	0.6741
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.019825	0.003570	-5.552828	0.0000
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.003150	0.003696	-0.852278	0.3943
REGION__WEST_	0.011896	0.003982	2.987346	0.0029
Y75	0.015062	0.006042	2.492898	0.0129
Y77	0.021534	0.006473	3.326974	0.0009
Y79	0.024166	0.006391	3.781347	0.0002
Y81	0.028130	0.006652	4.229075	0.0000
Y83	0.032549	0.006489	5.016146	0.0000
Y85	0.038539	0.007186	5.363179	0.0000
Y87	0.038050	0.007550	5.039975	0.0000
Y89	0.043129	0.007511	5.741739	0.0000
Y91	0.044742	0.007562	5.916987	0.0000
Y93	0.045575	0.007969	5.718904	0.0000
Y95	0.049314	0.008916	5.530959	0.0000
Y97	0.044766	0.009755	4.589085	0.0000
Y99	0.046174	0.009794	4.714623	0.0000
Y01	0.042753	0.010250	4.170847	0.0000
Y03	0.036490	0.010125	3.604005	0.0003

R-squared	0.647906	Mean dependent var	0.071940
Adjusted R-squared	0.634831	S.D. dependent var	0.052930
S.E. of regression	0.031985	Akaike info criterion	-4.010771
Sum squared resid	0.771368	Schwarz criterion	-3.838062
Log likelihood	1599.217	F-statistic	49.55260
Durbin-Watson stat	2.059648	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 3A

Dependent Variable: FEM_OFTOTAL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 10:41
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.056844	0.016015	-3.549480	0.0004
REPORG(-98)	0.007462	0.011638	0.641209	0.5216
DEMMARGIN	-0.005755	0.007282	-0.790335	0.4296
TURNOVER	0.000811	0.000184	4.410154	0.0000
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.028305	0.009344	3.029173	0.0025
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.004327	0.000951	4.549534	0.0000
IDEOLOGY(-49)	0.000774	0.000193	4.006342	0.0001
COLPCT2	0.232781	0.046592	4.996158	0.0000
FEMAG(-98)	0.016172	0.012225	1.322922	0.1863
FEMGOV(-98)	0.024487	0.010975	2.231139	0.0260
FEMSEN(-98)	0.030750	0.007780	3.952539	0.0001
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.031311	0.006466	-4.842185	0.0000
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.015102	0.006854	-2.203229	0.0279
REGION__WEST_	0.029061	0.006639	4.377368	0.0000
Y75	0.025604	0.008776	2.917518	0.0036
Y77	0.035619	0.009635	3.696771	0.0002
Y79	0.047059	0.009430	4.990379	0.0000
Y81	0.066782	0.010256	6.511634	0.0000
Y83	0.070111	0.009939	7.054287	0.0000
Y85	0.079254	0.010888	7.279235	0.0000
Y87	0.085517	0.011726	7.293041	0.0000
Y89	0.089496	0.012170	7.353764	0.0000
Y91	0.095648	0.012488	7.658977	0.0000
Y93	0.101254	0.012907	7.844810	0.0000
Y95	0.097121	0.014889	6.522953	0.0000
Y97	0.103438	0.015600	6.630600	0.0000
Y99	0.108866	0.016589	6.562467	0.0000
Y01	0.095583	0.017700	5.400271	0.0000
Y03	0.083583	0.016697	5.005934	0.0000

R-squared	0.653750	Mean dependent var	0.170133
Adjusted R-squared	0.640892	S.D. dependent var	0.090281
S.E. of regression	0.054101	Akaike info criterion	-2.959583
Sum squared resid	2.206922	Schwarz criterion	-2.786874
Log likelihood	1187.677	F-statistic	50.84349
Durbin-Watson stat	2.070272	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 3B
Dependent Variable: DEM_OFDEM
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 10:41
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.083946	0.020875	-4.021345	0.0001
REPORG(-98)	0.016055	0.011874	1.352128	0.1767
DEMMARGIN	-0.036734	0.010239	-3.587785	0.0004
TURNOVER	0.001129	0.000241	4.689804	0.0000
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.025448	0.009827	2.589558	0.0098
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.006994	0.001010	6.927627	0.0000
IDEOLOGY(-49)	0.000540	0.000271	1.992228	0.0467
COLPCT2	0.323768	0.058223	5.560786	0.0000
FEMAG(-98)	0.020108	0.013671	1.470823	0.1418
FEMGOV(-98)	0.036614	0.013170	2.780074	0.0056
FEMSEN(-98)	0.037377	0.007751	4.822083	0.0000
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.015550	0.009364	-1.660643	0.0972
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.010268	0.009031	-1.136979	0.2559
REGION__WEST_	0.045082	0.008642	5.216476	0.0000
Y75	0.028379	0.009675	2.933255	0.0035
Y77	0.034823	0.010853	3.208760	0.0014
Y79	0.041124	0.011721	3.508486	0.0005
Y81	0.067253	0.012620	5.328949	0.0000
Y83	0.063340	0.012300	5.149786	0.0000
Y85	0.080200	0.015674	5.116604	0.0000
Y87	0.084037	0.013954	6.022644	0.0000
Y89	0.087261	0.014538	6.002333	0.0000
Y91	0.089720	0.015256	5.880890	0.0000
Y93	0.094067	0.016893	5.568459	0.0000
Y95	0.097857	0.020918	4.678183	0.0000
Y97	0.105552	0.018674	5.652286	0.0000
Y99	0.119561	0.020573	5.811596	0.0000
Y01	0.106708	0.021482	4.967345	0.0000
Y03	0.100572	0.021899	4.592541	0.0000

R-squared	0.652520	Mean dependent var	0.186386
Adjusted R-squared	0.639616	S.D. dependent var	0.116915
S.E. of regression	0.070187	Akaike info criterion	-2.438987
Sum squared resid	3.714315	Schwarz criterion	-2.266279
Log likelihood	983.8636	F-statistic	50.56819
Durbin-Watson stat	2.056644	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 3C
Dependent Variable: REP_OFREP
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 10:42
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.031447	0.021867	-1.438085	0.1508
REPORG(-98)	-0.003844	0.015291	-0.251396	0.8016
DEMMARGIN	0.057268	0.011866	4.825999	0.0000
TURNOVER	0.000479	0.000262	1.826261	0.0682
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.050637	0.012765	3.966920	0.0001
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.003472	0.001238	2.804148	0.0052
IDEOLOGY(-49)	0.000820	0.000268	3.056128	0.0023
COLPCT2	0.166231	0.058967	2.819043	0.0049
FEMAG(-98)	0.015013	0.012593	1.192215	0.2336
FEMGOV(-98)	0.020544	0.015659	1.312002	0.1899
FEMSEN(-98)	3.16E-05	0.013033	0.002422	0.9981
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.059537	0.008499	-7.005175	0.0000
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.019575	0.008997	-2.175558	0.0299
REGION__WEST_	0.033326	0.008875	3.754828	0.0002
Y75	0.032410	0.017421	1.860409	0.0632
Y77	0.037787	0.016311	2.316625	0.0208
Y79	0.063415	0.014581	4.349270	0.0000
Y81	0.071452	0.014358	4.976495	0.0000
Y83	0.075309	0.015158	4.968284	0.0000
Y85	0.079718	0.015722	5.070585	0.0000
Y87	0.076332	0.016554	4.611137	0.0000
Y89	0.081311	0.016806	4.838304	0.0000
Y91	0.099391	0.017322	5.737762	0.0000
Y93	0.103926	0.018716	5.552893	0.0000
Y95	0.104825	0.020349	5.151244	0.0000
Y97	0.100602	0.021086	4.771015	0.0000
Y99	0.106678	0.021797	4.894106	0.0000
Y01	0.090417	0.022673	3.987951	0.0001
Y03	0.078472	0.022622	3.468833	0.0006

R-squared	0.407517	Mean dependent var	0.165276
Adjusted R-squared	0.385515	S.D. dependent var	0.098046
S.E. of regression	0.076858	Akaike info criterion	-2.257389
Sum squared resid	4.453956	Schwarz criterion	-2.084680
Log likelihood	912.7678	F-statistic	18.52180
Durbin-Watson stat	1.999529	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 3D
Dependent Variable: DEM_OFTOTAL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 10:43
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.088189	0.010705	-8.237732	0.0000
REPORG(-98)	0.005097	0.006431	0.792558	0.4283
DEMMARGIN	0.058131	0.005623	10.33715	0.0000
TURNOVER	0.000616	0.000129	4.759800	0.0000
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.011532	0.006180	1.866134	0.0624
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.002334	0.000562	4.156764	0.0000
IDEOLOGY(-49)	0.000915	0.000145	6.329341	0.0000
COLPCT2	0.190760	0.032714	5.831061	0.0000
FEMAG(-98)	0.002384	0.007662	0.311111	0.7558
FEMGOV(-98)	0.009378	0.006659	1.408314	0.1595
FEMSEN(-98)	0.029294	0.004711	6.217612	0.0000
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.011696	0.004848	-2.412664	0.0161
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.011660	0.005168	-2.255891	0.0244
REGION__WEST_	0.016439	0.004698	3.499113	0.0005
Y75	0.010580	0.006196	1.707708	0.0881
Y77	0.016029	0.006508	2.462812	0.0140
Y79	0.024748	0.006642	3.725907	0.0002
Y81	0.040645	0.007109	5.717664	0.0000
Y83	0.039407	0.006921	5.693934	0.0000
Y85	0.042367	0.007971	5.314872	0.0000
Y87	0.049089	0.007974	6.156434	0.0000
Y89	0.047946	0.008445	5.677399	0.0000
Y91	0.052111	0.008809	5.915434	0.0000
Y93	0.056608	0.009538	5.934911	0.0000
Y95	0.048574	0.010758	4.515281	0.0000
Y97	0.059407	0.010690	5.557403	0.0000
Y99	0.063124	0.011579	5.451613	0.0000
Y01	0.053023	0.012010	4.414878	0.0000
Y03	0.047077	0.011702	4.022896	0.0001

R-squared	0.589437	Mean dependent var	0.098193
Adjusted R-squared	0.574191	S.D. dependent var	0.056478
S.E. of regression	0.036854	Akaike info criterion	-3.727368
Sum squared resid	1.024099	Schwarz criterion	-3.554659
Log likelihood	1488.265	F-statistic	38.66085
Durbin-Watson stat	1.992073	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 3E
Dependent Variable: REP_OFTOTAL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 10:45
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0.031345	0.009494	3.301613	0.0010
REPORG(-98)	0.002365	0.007309	0.323603	0.7463
DEMMARGIN	-0.063886	0.004241	-15.06214	0.0000
TURNOVER	0.000195	0.000108	1.816495	0.0697
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.016773	0.005162	3.249287	0.0012
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.001993	0.000575	3.464201	0.0006
IDEOLOGY(-49)	-0.000141	9.94E-05	-1.416435	0.1571
COLPCT2	0.042021	0.024728	1.699347	0.0897
FEMAG(-98)	0.013789	0.006557	2.102803	0.0358
FEMGOV(-98)	0.015109	0.007928	1.905692	0.0571
FEMSEN(-98)	0.001457	0.005068	0.287395	0.7739
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.019616	0.003574	-5.488199	0.0000
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.003442	0.003720	-0.925295	0.3551
REGION__WEST_	0.012622	0.003950	3.195285	0.0015
Y75	0.015024	0.006012	2.498841	0.0127
Y77	0.019590	0.006207	3.155875	0.0017
Y79	0.022311	0.006223	3.585220	0.0004
Y81	0.026137	0.006442	4.057049	0.0001
Y83	0.030704	0.006299	4.874558	0.0000
Y85	0.036888	0.007060	5.225072	0.0000
Y87	0.036427	0.007424	4.907031	0.0000
Y89	0.041551	0.007485	5.551038	0.0000
Y91	0.043537	0.007550	5.766762	0.0000
Y93	0.044647	0.007951	5.615472	0.0000
Y95	0.048547	0.008984	5.403574	0.0000
Y97	0.044031	0.009815	4.486194	0.0000
Y99	0.045741	0.009872	4.633264	0.0000
Y01	0.042561	0.010292	4.135150	0.0000
Y03	0.036506	0.010173	3.588667	0.0004

R-squared	0.647357	Mean dependent var	0.071940
Adjusted R-squared	0.634262	S.D. dependent var	0.052930
S.E. of regression	0.032010	Akaike info criterion	-4.009214
Sum squared resid	0.772570	Schwarz criterion	-3.836505
Log likelihood	1598.607	F-statistic	49.43362
Durbin-Watson stat	2.067895	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 4A
Dependent Variable: FEM_OFTOTAL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 10:47
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.053368	0.015871	-3.362562	0.0008
DEMORG(-98)	0.024181	0.008411	2.874860	0.0042
DEMMARGIN	-0.005734	0.007240	-0.791999	0.4286
TURNOVER	0.000742	0.000187	3.961150	0.0001
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.028987	0.009285	3.122107	0.0019
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.004614	0.000942	4.897673	0.0000
IDEOLOGY(-49)	0.000755	0.000190	3.985386	0.0001
COLPCT2	0.229075	0.046523	4.923922	0.0000
FEMAG(-98)	0.016602	0.012154	1.366044	0.1723
FEMGOV(-98)	0.023234	0.011434	2.032037	0.0425
FEMSEN(-98)	0.030278	0.007717	3.923756	0.0001
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.030452	0.006435	-4.732252	0.0000
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.014440	0.006767	-2.133965	0.0332
REGION__WEST_	0.027998	0.006743	4.152208	0.0000
Y75	0.025459	0.008642	2.945957	0.0033
Y77	0.035155	0.009512	3.696054	0.0002
Y79	0.046640	0.009356	4.985202	0.0000
Y81	0.065998	0.010233	6.449225	0.0000
Y83	0.069152	0.009946	6.952974	0.0000
Y85	0.077999	0.010873	7.173655	0.0000
Y87	0.084312	0.011759	7.170308	0.0000
Y89	0.088272	0.012189	7.241746	0.0000
Y91	0.094272	0.012540	7.517850	0.0000
Y93	0.100016	0.012858	7.778639	0.0000
Y95	0.095381	0.014904	6.399815	0.0000
Y97	0.098621	0.015843	6.224750	0.0000
Y99	0.104735	0.016911	6.193451	0.0000
Y01	0.090440	0.018010	5.021711	0.0000
Y03	0.078911	0.016695	4.726694	0.0000

R-squared	0.657398	Mean dependent var	0.170133
Adjusted R-squared	0.644675	S.D. dependent var	0.090281
S.E. of regression	0.053816	Akaike info criterion	-2.970174
Sum squared resid	2.183672	Schwarz criterion	-2.797465
Log likelihood	1191.823	F-statistic	51.67153
Durbin-Watson stat	2.076364	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 4B
Dependent Variable: DEM_OFDEM
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 10:47
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.075142	0.020436	-3.677043	0.0003
DEMORG(-98)	0.062087	0.011455	5.420193	0.0000
DEMMARGIN	-0.036687	0.010026	-3.659162	0.0003
TURNOVER	0.000950	0.000239	3.973860	0.0001
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.027349	0.009755	2.803565	0.0052
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.007749	0.000984	7.875418	0.0000
IDEOLOGY(-49)	0.000492	0.000259	1.898348	0.0580
COLPCT2	0.314277	0.057236	5.490906	0.0000
FEMAG(-98)	0.021426	0.013586	1.577021	0.1152
FEMGOV(-98)	0.032967	0.013805	2.388077	0.0172
FEMSEN(-98)	0.035812	0.007359	4.866755	0.0000
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.013207	0.009165	-1.441098	0.1500
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.008664	0.008793	-0.985297	0.3248
REGION__WEST_	0.042437	0.008604	4.932193	0.0000
Y75	0.028006	0.009389	2.982867	0.0029
Y77	0.033624	0.010559	3.184486	0.0015
Y79	0.040044	0.011568	3.461727	0.0006
Y81	0.065243	0.012535	5.204896	0.0000
Y83	0.060888	0.012314	4.944531	0.0000
Y85	0.076966	0.015533	4.954967	0.0000
Y87	0.080938	0.013889	5.827303	0.0000
Y89	0.084110	0.014437	5.825970	0.0000
Y91	0.086182	0.015276	5.641808	0.0000
Y93	0.090884	0.016404	5.540204	0.0000
Y95	0.093314	0.020402	4.573757	0.0000
Y97	0.093068	0.018530	5.022435	0.0000
Y99	0.108769	0.020461	5.315814	0.0000
Y01	0.093276	0.021285	4.382271	0.0000
Y03	0.088278	0.020999	4.203866	0.0000

R-squared	0.667064	Mean dependent var	0.186386
Adjusted R-squared	0.654700	S.D. dependent var	0.116915
S.E. of regression	0.068702	Akaike info criterion	-2.481743
Sum squared resid	3.558855	Schwarz criterion	-2.309034
Log likelihood	1000.602	F-statistic	53.95345
Durbin-Watson stat	2.047717	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 4C
Dependent Variable: REP_OFREP
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 10:48
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.034239	0.022078	-1.550782	0.1214
DEMORG(-98)	-0.020053	0.010330	-1.941158	0.0526
DEMMARGIN	0.057255	0.011802	4.851282	0.0000
TURNOVER	0.000537	0.000265	2.028018	0.0429
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.049958	0.012755	3.916821	0.0001
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.003220	0.001262	2.552627	0.0109
IDEOLOGY(-49)	0.000835	0.000269	3.104583	0.0020
COLPCT2	0.169286	0.058932	2.872566	0.0042
FEMAG(-98)	0.014495	0.012568	1.153401	0.2491
FEMGOV(-98)	0.021908	0.015047	1.455948	0.1458
FEMSEN(-98)	0.000689	0.012295	0.056078	0.9553
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.060354	0.008563	-7.048586	0.0000
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.020051	0.008950	-2.240434	0.0254
REGION__WEST_	0.034145	0.008791	3.883841	0.0001
Y75	0.032531	0.017506	1.858246	0.0635
Y77	0.038178	0.016383	2.330362	0.0200
Y79	0.063766	0.014623	4.360541	0.0000
Y81	0.072099	0.014390	5.010457	0.0000
Y83	0.076097	0.015197	5.007326	0.0000
Y85	0.080767	0.015721	5.137501	0.0000
Y87	0.077335	0.016556	4.671220	0.0000
Y89	0.082331	0.016812	4.897039	0.0000
Y91	0.100536	0.017355	5.792745	0.0000
Y93	0.104956	0.018622	5.636185	0.0000
Y95	0.106325	0.020193	5.265315	0.0000
Y97	0.104684	0.021079	4.966180	0.0000
Y99	0.110245	0.021731	5.073184	0.0000
Y01	0.094853	0.022706	4.177363	0.0000
Y03	0.082572	0.022721	3.634252	0.0003

R-squared	0.409706	Mean dependent var	0.165276
Adjusted R-squared	0.387786	S.D. dependent var	0.098046
S.E. of regression	0.076716	Akaike info criterion	-2.261091
Sum squared resid	4.437497	Schwarz criterion	-2.088382
Log likelihood	914.2172	F-statistic	18.69037
Durbin-Watson stat	1.995210	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 4D
Dependent Variable: DEM_OFTOTAL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 10:49
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.084887	0.010656	-7.966384	0.0000
DEMORG(-98)	0.023558	0.005653	4.167154	0.0000
DEMMARGIN	0.058147	0.005568	10.44285	0.0000
TURNOVER	0.000548	0.000130	4.209307	0.0000
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.012302	0.006138	2.004121	0.0454
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.002627	0.000545	4.821658	0.0000
IDEOLOGY(-49)	0.000897	0.000141	6.343905	0.0000
COLPCT2	0.187167	0.032529	5.753809	0.0000
FEMAG(-98)	0.002952	0.007706	0.383086	0.7018
FEMGOV(-98)	0.007856	0.006830	1.150149	0.2504
FEMSEN(-98)	0.028587	0.004282	6.676293	0.0000
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.010762	0.004777	-2.253089	0.0245
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.011081	0.005064	-2.188139	0.0290
REGION__WEST_	0.015461	0.004701	3.288929	0.0011
Y75	0.010438	0.006134	1.701625	0.0892
Y77	0.015571	0.006450	2.414018	0.0160
Y79	0.024337	0.006623	3.674809	0.0003
Y81	0.039884	0.007124	5.598750	0.0000
Y83	0.038479	0.006976	5.516052	0.0000
Y85	0.041137	0.007973	5.159329	0.0000
Y87	0.047911	0.008003	5.987023	0.0000
Y89	0.046748	0.008473	5.517545	0.0000
Y91	0.050767	0.008881	5.716251	0.0000
Y93	0.055398	0.009427	5.876837	0.0000
Y95	0.046826	0.010631	4.404805	0.0000
Y97	0.054633	0.010814	5.052029	0.0000
Y99	0.058970	0.011748	5.019488	0.0000
Y01	0.047854	0.012294	3.892355	0.0001
Y03	0.042316	0.011669	3.626478	0.0003

R-squared	0.598499	Mean dependent var	0.098193
Adjusted R-squared	0.583589	S.D. dependent var	0.056478
S.E. of regression	0.036445	Akaike info criterion	-3.749687
Sum squared resid	1.001495	Schwarz criterion	-3.576979
Log likelihood	1497.003	F-statistic	40.14121
Durbin-Watson stat	2.002909	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 4E
Dependent Variable: REP_OFTOTAL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 10:50
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0.031519	0.009497	3.318739	0.0009
DEMORG(-98)	0.000623	0.005217	0.119382	0.9050
DEMMARGIN	-0.063881	0.004241	-15.06380	0.0000
TURNOVER	0.000194	0.000109	1.777593	0.0759
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.016686	0.005147	3.241835	0.0012
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.001987	0.000583	3.407600	0.0007
IDEOLOGY(-49)	-0.000142	9.92E-05	-1.429627	0.1532
COLPCT2	0.041908	0.024753	1.693090	0.0909
FEMAG(-98)	0.013650	0.006540	2.087337	0.0372
FEMGOV(-98)	0.015378	0.007854	1.958065	0.0506
FEMSEN(-98)	0.001691	0.005013	0.337393	0.7359
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.019690	0.003592	-5.481050	0.0000
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.003358	0.003712	-0.904641	0.3659
REGION__WEST_	0.012537	0.003967	3.160143	0.0016
Y75	0.015021	0.006010	2.499099	0.0127
Y77	0.019585	0.006207	3.155076	0.0017
Y79	0.022303	0.006224	3.583611	0.0004
Y81	0.026114	0.006446	4.051416	0.0001
Y83	0.030674	0.006308	4.862621	0.0000
Y85	0.036863	0.007068	5.215619	0.0000
Y87	0.036401	0.007437	4.894590	0.0000
Y89	0.041523	0.007495	5.540299	0.0000
Y91	0.043505	0.007566	5.749989	0.0000
Y93	0.044618	0.007946	5.615184	0.0000
Y95	0.048554	0.008979	5.407448	0.0000
Y97	0.043988	0.009882	4.451383	0.0000
Y99	0.045766	0.009959	4.595548	0.0000
Y01	0.042586	0.010321	4.125942	0.0000
Y03	0.036595	0.010186	3.592723	0.0003

R-squared	0.647314	Mean dependent var	0.071940
Adjusted R-squared	0.634217	S.D. dependent var	0.052930
S.E. of regression	0.032012	Akaike info criterion	-4.009091
Sum squared resid	0.772666	Schwarz criterion	-3.836382
Log likelihood	1598.559	F-statistic	49.42418
Durbin-Watson stat	2.065930	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 5A
Dependent Variable: FEM_OFTOTAL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 10:52
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.052710	0.016118	-3.270212	0.0011
FUND(-98)	0.005213	0.003515	1.483046	0.1385
DEMMARGIN	-0.005883	0.007224	-0.814350	0.4157
TURNOVER	0.000797	0.000185	4.308890	0.0000
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.029514	0.009317	3.167895	0.0016
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.004503	0.000970	4.643113	0.0000
IDEOLOGY(-49)	0.000730	0.000193	3.792572	0.0002
COLPCT2	0.223513	0.046740	4.782009	0.0000
FEMAG(-98)	0.016611	0.012088	1.374174	0.1698
FEMGOV(-98)	0.023819	0.011224	2.122100	0.0342
FEMSEN(-98)	0.030724	0.007600	4.042692	0.0001
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.031660	0.006434	-4.920335	0.0000
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.014674	0.006806	-2.155906	0.0314
REGION__WEST_	0.029372	0.006629	4.431056	0.0000
Y75	0.025694	0.008706	2.951467	0.0033
Y77	0.034555	0.009663	3.576023	0.0004
Y79	0.045947	0.009481	4.846261	0.0000
Y81	0.065514	0.010328	6.343417	0.0000
Y83	0.068990	0.010012	6.890641	0.0000
Y85	0.078255	0.010932	7.158466	0.0000
Y87	0.084501	0.011816	7.151288	0.0000
Y89	0.088864	0.012191	7.289506	0.0000
Y91	0.095065	0.012534	7.584472	0.0000
Y93	0.100959	0.012854	7.854410	0.0000
Y95	0.097119	0.014806	6.559588	0.0000
Y97	0.102931	0.015588	6.603303	0.0000
Y99	0.109001	0.016547	6.587273	0.0000
Y01	0.096089	0.017611	5.456300	0.0000
Y03	0.084337	0.016603	5.079584	0.0000

R-squared	0.654411	Mean dependent var	0.170133
Adjusted R-squared	0.641577	S.D. dependent var	0.090281
S.E. of regression	0.054050	Akaike info criterion	-2.961494
Sum squared resid	2.202709	Schwarz criterion	-2.788785
Log likelihood	1188.425	F-statistic	50.99223
Durbin-Watson stat	2.056585	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 5B
Dependent Variable: DEM_OFDEM
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 10:53
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.071209	0.020737	-3.433926	0.0006
FUND(-98)	0.016431	0.004764	3.449372	0.0006
DEMMARGIN	-0.037152	0.010090	-3.681886	0.0002
TURNOVER	0.001083	0.000239	4.527530	0.0000
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.029617	0.009797	3.023075	0.0026
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.007593	0.001005	7.552918	0.0000
IDEOLOGY(-49)	0.000403	0.000267	1.507130	0.1322
COLPCT2	0.294615	0.057414	5.131375	0.0000
FEMAG(-98)	0.022006	0.013384	1.644211	0.1005
FEMGOV(-98)	0.033475	0.013163	2.543007	0.0112
FEMSEN(-98)	0.036447	0.007403	4.923132	0.0000
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.016317	0.009266	-1.760984	0.0786
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.009150	0.009034	-1.012816	0.3115
REGION__WEST_	0.046260	0.008563	5.402189	0.0000
Y75	0.028662	0.009497	3.018101	0.0026
Y77	0.031447	0.010757	2.923487	0.0036
Y79	0.037608	0.011688	3.217527	0.0013
Y81	0.063266	0.012664	4.995686	0.0000
Y83	0.059827	0.012436	4.810911	0.0000
Y85	0.077023	0.015700	4.905788	0.0000
Y87	0.080820	0.013998	5.773553	0.0000
Y89	0.085254	0.014459	5.896391	0.0000
Y91	0.087870	0.015241	5.765487	0.0000
Y93	0.093124	0.016631	5.599541	0.0000
Y95	0.097672	0.020414	4.784486	0.0000
Y97	0.103677	0.018430	5.625427	0.0000
Y99	0.119537	0.020288	5.891923	0.0000
Y01	0.107760	0.021050	5.119200	0.0000
Y03	0.102228	0.021337	4.791069	0.0000

R-squared	0.656987	Mean dependent var	0.186386
Adjusted R-squared	0.644249	S.D. dependent var	0.116915
S.E. of regression	0.069734	Akaike info criterion	-2.451927
Sum squared resid	3.666563	Schwarz criterion	-2.279218
Log likelihood	988.9294	F-statistic	51.57748
Durbin-Watson stat	2.017996	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 5C
Dependent Variable: REP_OFREP
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 10:53
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.037589	0.022931	-1.639208	0.1016
FUND(-98)	-0.008128	0.005316	-1.529089	0.1267
DEMMARGIN	0.057482	0.011847	4.852083	0.0000
TURNOVER	0.000502	0.000262	1.916608	0.0557
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.048376	0.012815	3.774865	0.0002
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.003151	0.001294	2.436015	0.0151
IDEOLOGY(-49)	0.000887	0.000276	3.216512	0.0014
COLPCT2	0.180620	0.061164	2.953047	0.0032
FEMAG(-98)	0.013793	0.012548	1.099256	0.2720
FEMGOV(-98)	0.022665	0.014840	1.527240	0.1271
FEMSEN(-98)	0.000957	0.012391	0.077263	0.9384
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.059340	0.008513	-6.970659	0.0000
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.020001	0.009001	-2.221971	0.0266
REGION__WEST_	0.032635	0.008728	3.738942	0.0002
Y75	0.032271	0.017500	1.843998	0.0656
Y77	0.039469	0.016440	2.400846	0.0166
Y79	0.065160	0.014689	4.435889	0.0000
Y81	0.073418	0.014490	5.066695	0.0000
Y83	0.077036	0.015329	5.025349	0.0000
Y85	0.081304	0.015781	5.151943	0.0000
Y87	0.077931	0.016611	4.691627	0.0000
Y89	0.082311	0.016783	4.904315	0.0000
Y91	0.100314	0.017317	5.792687	0.0000
Y93	0.104398	0.018693	5.584859	0.0000
Y95	0.105016	0.020247	5.186850	0.0000
Y97	0.101683	0.021015	4.838488	0.0000
Y99	0.106936	0.021629	4.944070	0.0000
Y01	0.090194	0.022655	3.981122	0.0001
Y03	0.078049	0.022605	3.452767	0.0006

R-squared	0.409200	Mean dependent var	0.165276
Adjusted R-squared	0.387260	S.D. dependent var	0.098046
S.E. of regression	0.076748	Akaike info criterion	-2.260233
Sum squared resid	4.441307	Schwarz criterion	-2.087524
Log likelihood	913.8812	F-statistic	18.65124
Durbin-Watson stat	2.008404	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 5D
Dependent Variable: DEM_OFTOTAL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 11:02
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.082969	0.010709	-7.747753	0.0000
FUND(-98)	0.006812	0.002413	2.822651	0.0049
DEMMARGIN	0.057955	0.005560	10.42432	0.0000
TURNOVER	0.000597	0.000129	4.624475	0.0000
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.013336	0.006137	2.172987	0.0301
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.002592	0.000555	4.670641	0.0000
IDEOLOGY(-49)	0.000858	0.000144	5.952681	0.0000
COLPCT2	0.178686	0.032343	5.524642	0.0000
FEMAG(-98)	0.003278	0.007539	0.434725	0.6639
FEMGOV(-98)	0.007860	0.006648	1.182259	0.2375
FEMSEN(-98)	0.028731	0.004453	6.451826	0.0000
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.011944	0.004781	-2.498403	0.0127
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.011244	0.005167	-2.176178	0.0299
REGION__WEST_	0.016968	0.004641	3.656363	0.0003
Y75	0.010697	0.006123	1.746954	0.0811
Y77	0.014624	0.006489	2.253551	0.0245
Y79	0.023288	0.006647	3.503706	0.0005
Y81	0.038995	0.007134	5.466268	0.0000
Y83	0.037954	0.006995	5.426144	0.0000
Y85	0.041044	0.007998	5.131593	0.0000
Y87	0.047752	0.008002	5.967642	0.0000
Y89	0.047111	0.008430	5.588390	0.0000
Y91	0.051341	0.008834	5.811951	0.0000
Y93	0.056214	0.009439	5.955395	0.0000
Y95	0.048460	0.010579	4.580822	0.0000
Y97	0.058572	0.010630	5.510077	0.0000
Y99	0.063021	0.011540	5.460887	0.0000
Y01	0.053346	0.011950	4.464234	0.0000
Y03	0.047613	0.011569	4.115657	0.0000

R-squared	0.592874	Mean dependent var	0.098193
Adjusted R-squared	0.577756	S.D. dependent var	0.056478
S.E. of regression	0.036699	Akaike info criterion	-3.735775
Sum squared resid	1.015526	Schwarz criterion	-3.563067
Log likelihood	1491.556	F-statistic	39.21459
Durbin-Watson stat	1.971541	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 5E
Dependent Variable: REP_OFTOTAL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 11:02
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0.030258	0.009767	3.098037	0.0020
FUND(-98)	-0.001599	0.002249	-0.711230	0.4772
DEMMARGIN	-0.063838	0.004235	-15.07460	0.0000
TURNOVER	0.000200	0.000107	1.860947	0.0631
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.016178	0.005181	3.122611	0.0019
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.001911	0.000604	3.166302	0.0016
IDEOLOGY(-49)	-0.000128	0.000101	-1.277194	0.2019
COLPCT2	0.044827	0.025629	1.749080	0.0807
FEMAG(-98)	0.013334	0.006544	2.037451	0.0420
FEMGOV(-98)	0.015959	0.007684	2.077010	0.0381
FEMSEN(-98)	0.001993	0.004915	0.405566	0.6852
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.019716	0.003572	-5.519154	0.0000
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.003430	0.003710	-0.924468	0.3555
REGION__WEST_	0.012404	0.003926	3.159771	0.0016
Y75	0.014997	0.006028	2.487859	0.0131
Y77	0.019930	0.006286	3.170516	0.0016
Y79	0.022659	0.006277	3.609558	0.0003
Y81	0.026519	0.006493	4.084110	0.0000
Y83	0.031035	0.006351	4.886515	0.0000
Y85	0.037211	0.007088	5.249938	0.0000
Y87	0.036748	0.007453	4.931003	0.0000
Y89	0.041753	0.007489	5.575022	0.0000
Y91	0.043724	0.007549	5.791855	0.0000
Y93	0.044744	0.007943	5.632937	0.0000
Y95	0.048659	0.008951	5.436105	0.0000
Y97	0.044360	0.009793	4.529832	0.0000
Y99	0.045980	0.009813	4.685613	0.0000
Y01	0.042743	0.010249	4.170242	0.0000
Y03	0.036724	0.010129	3.625500	0.0003

R-squared	0.647535	Mean dependent var	0.071940
Adjusted R-squared	0.634446	S.D. dependent var	0.052930
S.E. of regression	0.032002	Akaike info criterion	-4.009718
Sum squared resid	0.772181	Schwarz criterion	-3.837010
Log likelihood	1598.805	F-statistic	49.47214
Durbin-Watson stat	2.070048	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 6A
Dependent Variable: FEM_OFTOTAL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 11:04
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.053227	0.015837	-3.360937	0.0008
TRAIN(-98)	0.014955	0.004888	3.059320	0.0023
DEMMARGIN	-0.007007	0.007119	-0.984150	0.3254
TURNOVER	0.000768	0.000184	4.169387	0.0000
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.030286	0.009095	3.329908	0.0009
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.004625	0.000934	4.953146	0.0000
IDEOLOGY(-49)	0.000715	0.000191	3.740715	0.0002
COLPCT2	0.221850	0.046567	4.764069	0.0000
FEMAG(-98)	0.019735	0.012145	1.624910	0.1046
FEMGOV(-98)	0.024261	0.010827	2.240767	0.0253
FEMSEN(-98)	0.030626	0.007511	4.077237	0.0001
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.027111	0.006496	-4.173222	0.0000
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.010566	0.006695	-1.578197	0.1149
REGION__WEST_	0.030965	0.006626	4.672998	0.0000
Y75	0.025348	0.008536	2.969361	0.0031
Y77	0.031990	0.009487	3.372082	0.0008
Y79	0.042899	0.009448	4.540668	0.0000
Y81	0.061701	0.010245	6.022589	0.0000
Y83	0.065181	0.009869	6.604497	0.0000
Y85	0.074382	0.010738	6.926653	0.0000
Y87	0.080516	0.011784	6.832896	0.0000
Y89	0.084507	0.012111	6.977528	0.0000
Y91	0.091585	0.012438	7.363304	0.0000
Y93	0.098445	0.012904	7.629089	0.0000
Y95	0.094582	0.014810	6.386579	0.0000
Y97	0.099889	0.015451	6.464717	0.0000
Y99	0.105472	0.016384	6.437528	0.0000
Y01	0.092737	0.017477	5.306382	0.0000
Y03	0.080636	0.016554	4.871006	0.0000

R-squared	0.658145	Mean dependent var	0.170133
Adjusted R-squared	0.645450	S.D. dependent var	0.090281
S.E. of regression	0.053757	Akaike info criterion	-2.972356
Sum squared resid	2.178912	Schwarz criterion	-2.799647
Log likelihood	1192.677	F-statistic	51.84325
Durbin-Watson stat	2.083166	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 6B
Dependent Variable: DEM_OFDEM
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 11:05
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.078780	0.020284	-3.883739	0.0001
TRAIN(-98)	0.020417	0.006634	3.077796	0.0022
DEMMARGIN	-0.038431	0.010002	-3.842271	0.0001
TURNOVER	0.001070	0.000238	4.486551	0.0000
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.027869	0.009586	2.907200	0.0038
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.007366	0.000982	7.500853	0.0000
IDEOLOGY(-49)	0.000457	0.000265	1.726651	0.0846
COLPCT2	0.308798	0.057713	5.350560	0.0000
FEMAG(-98)	0.024568	0.013524	1.816688	0.0697
FEMGOV(-98)	0.037119	0.012742	2.913146	0.0037
FEMSEN(-98)	0.037874	0.007422	5.102879	0.0000
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.010077	0.009476	-1.063450	0.2879
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.003894	0.008975	-0.433932	0.6645
REGION__WEST_	0.047527	0.008578	5.540470	0.0000
Y75	0.028030	0.009408	2.979280	0.0030
Y77	0.029886	0.010755	2.778733	0.0056
Y79	0.035452	0.011770	3.012195	0.0027
Y81	0.060307	0.012589	4.790463	0.0000
Y83	0.056593	0.012464	4.540566	0.0000
Y85	0.073568	0.015740	4.673820	0.0000
Y87	0.077222	0.014043	5.498890	0.0000
Y89	0.080461	0.014451	5.568014	0.0000
Y91	0.084185	0.015281	5.509041	0.0000
Y93	0.090240	0.016896	5.340789	0.0000
Y95	0.094533	0.020645	4.578991	0.0000
Y97	0.100925	0.018420	5.479099	0.0000
Y99	0.115280	0.020343	5.666813	0.0000
Y01	0.103248	0.021137	4.884640	0.0000
Y03	0.097116	0.021720	4.471171	0.0000

R-squared	0.657117	Mean dependent var	0.186386
Adjusted R-squared	0.644383	S.D. dependent var	0.116915
S.E. of regression	0.069721	Akaike info criterion	-2.452304
Sum squared resid	3.665181	Schwarz criterion	-2.279595
Log likelihood	989.0769	F-statistic	51.60707
Durbin-Watson stat	2.037006	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 6C
Dependent Variable: REP_OFREP
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 11:05
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.031555	0.022175	-1.422996	0.1552
TRAIN(-98)	0.000190	0.006909	0.027551	0.9780
DEMMARGIN	0.057244	0.011955	4.788496	0.0000
TURNOVER	0.000478	0.000263	1.817721	0.0695
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.050852	0.012775	3.980550	0.0001
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.003500	0.001235	2.834593	0.0047
IDEOLOGY(-49)	0.000820	0.000274	2.990973	0.0029
COLPCT2	0.166123	0.059518	2.791132	0.0054
FEMAG(-98)	0.015329	0.012546	1.221854	0.2221
FEMGOV(-98)	0.019995	0.015643	1.278229	0.2016
FEMSEN(-98)	-0.000418	0.012864	-0.032466	0.9741
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.059308	0.008936	-6.637376	0.0000
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.019639	0.009345	-2.101521	0.0359
REGION__WEST_	0.033453	0.008823	3.791827	0.0002
Y75	0.032406	0.017410	1.861296	0.0631
Y77	0.037729	0.016407	2.299597	0.0217
Y79	0.063357	0.014783	4.285882	0.0000
Y81	0.071394	0.014724	4.848757	0.0000
Y83	0.075257	0.015330	4.909265	0.0000
Y85	0.079642	0.015867	5.019271	0.0000
Y87	0.076260	0.016785	4.543440	0.0000
Y89	0.081240	0.016869	4.816009	0.0000
Y91	0.099331	0.017368	5.719233	0.0000
Y93	0.103884	0.018699	5.555514	0.0000
Y95	0.104698	0.020358	5.142732	0.0000
Y97	0.100410	0.021018	4.777417	0.0000
Y99	0.106398	0.021752	4.891303	0.0000
Y01	0.090096	0.022690	3.970650	0.0001
Y03	0.078055	0.022615	3.451524	0.0006

R-squared	0.407478	Mean dependent var	0.165276
Adjusted R-squared	0.385475	S.D. dependent var	0.098046
S.E. of regression	0.076860	Akaike info criterion	-2.257324
Sum squared resid	4.454246	Schwarz criterion	-2.084615
Log likelihood	912.7423	F-statistic	18.51884
Durbin-Watson stat	2.000553	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 6D
Dependent Variable: DEM_OFTOTAL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 11:06
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.085898	0.010531	-8.156620	0.0000
TRAIN(-98)	0.009407	0.003331	2.823898	0.0049
DEMMARGIN	0.057344	0.005541	10.34928	0.0000
TURNOVER	0.000589	0.000129	4.546309	0.0000
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.012759	0.006038	2.113093	0.0349
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.002519	0.000546	4.612554	0.0000
IDEOLOGY(-49)	0.000878	0.000142	6.166671	0.0000
COLPCT2	0.183880	0.032309	5.691342	0.0000
FEMAG(-98)	0.004597	0.007580	0.606426	0.5444
FEMGOV(-98)	0.009291	0.006441	1.442454	0.1496
FEMSEN(-98)	0.029261	0.004427	6.610189	0.0000
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.009071	0.004864	-1.864861	0.0626
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.008794	0.005115	-1.719306	0.0860
REGION__WEST_	0.017626	0.004612	3.821327	0.0001
Y75	0.010419	0.006105	1.706503	0.0883
Y77	0.013747	0.006486	2.119649	0.0344
Y79	0.022132	0.006696	3.305284	0.0010
Y81	0.037448	0.007102	5.272611	0.0000
Y83	0.036304	0.006984	5.197873	0.0000
Y85	0.039303	0.007972	4.930042	0.0000
Y87	0.045944	0.008006	5.738675	0.0000
Y89	0.044808	0.008429	5.315690	0.0000
Y91	0.049556	0.008830	5.612362	0.0000
Y93	0.054841	0.009561	5.735642	0.0000
Y95	0.046987	0.010707	4.388475	0.0000
Y97	0.057189	0.010650	5.369676	0.0000
Y99	0.061014	0.011560	5.278193	0.0000
Y01	0.051262	0.011987	4.276619	0.0000
Y03	0.045262	0.011718	3.862511	0.0001

R-squared	0.593849	Mean dependent var	0.098193
Adjusted R-squared	0.578767	S.D. dependent var	0.056478
S.E. of regression	0.036656	Akaike info criterion	-3.738172
Sum squared resid	1.013094	Schwarz criterion	-3.565464
Log likelihood	1492.494	F-statistic	39.37333
Durbin-Watson stat	1.992769	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 6E
Dependent Variable: REP_OFTOTAL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/02/05 Time: 11:06
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 783
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	0.032671	0.009542	3.424051	0.0007
TRAIN(-98)	0.005548	0.002876	1.929031	0.0541
DEMMARGIN	-0.064351	0.004208	-15.29193	0.0000
TURNOVER	0.000179	0.000108	1.663889	0.0966
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.017527	0.005115	3.426494	0.0006
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.002106	0.000574	3.668782	0.0003
IDEOLOGY(-49)	-0.000163	0.000101	-1.614264	0.1069
COLPCT2	0.037969	0.025154	1.509479	0.1316
FEMAG(-98)	0.015138	0.006523	2.320664	0.0206
FEMGOV(-98)	0.014969	0.007900	1.894961	0.0585
FEMSEN(-98)	0.001365	0.005103	0.267376	0.7893
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.018040	0.003626	-4.974909	0.0000
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.001773	0.003693	-0.480024	0.6313
REGION__WEST_	0.013339	0.003994	3.339741	0.0009
Y75	0.014929	0.005939	2.513890	0.0121
Y77	0.018243	0.006177	2.953273	0.0032
Y79	0.020768	0.006241	3.327732	0.0009
Y81	0.024253	0.006492	3.735599	0.0002
Y83	0.028877	0.006263	4.610499	0.0000
Y85	0.035079	0.007064	4.966007	0.0000
Y87	0.034572	0.007501	4.609073	0.0000
Y89	0.039699	0.007462	5.320087	0.0000
Y91	0.042029	0.007497	5.606264	0.0000
Y93	0.043604	0.007919	5.506269	0.0000
Y95	0.047595	0.008958	5.313180	0.0000
Y97	0.042699	0.009727	4.389596	0.0000
Y99	0.044458	0.009738	4.565606	0.0000
Y01	0.041476	0.010157	4.083613	0.0000
Y03	0.035374	0.010038	3.524181	0.0005

R-squared	0.649135	Mean dependent var	0.071940
Adjusted R-squared	0.636106	S.D. dependent var	0.052930
S.E. of regression	0.031929	Akaike info criterion	-4.014269
Sum squared resid	0.768675	Schwarz criterion	-3.841561
Log likelihood	1600.586	F-statistic	49.82062
Durbin-Watson stat	2.080713	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 7A
Dependent Variable: FEM_OFTOTAL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/16/05 Time: 09:58
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 784
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.049819	0.016127	-3.089098	0.0021
NPORG(-98)	0.006635	0.003906	1.698526	0.0898
DEMORG(-98)	0.022801	0.008494	2.684390	0.0074
REPORG(-98)	0.004161	0.013938	0.298521	0.7654
DEMMARGIN100	-6.09E-05	7.21E-05	-0.845136	0.3983
TURNOVER	0.000726	0.000187	3.888499	0.0001
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.030461	0.009138	3.333410	0.0009
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.005178	0.000989	5.237799	0.0000
IDEOLOGY(-49)	0.000735	0.000191	3.849692	0.0001
EDUCATION	0.002111	0.000481	4.389835	0.0000
FEMAG(-98)	0.018812	0.012081	1.557215	0.1198
FEMGOV(-98)	0.023011	0.011643	1.976323	0.0485
FEMSEN(-98)	0.029108	0.008131	3.579889	0.0004
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.030021	0.006375	-4.709083	0.0000
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.015078	0.006693	-2.252666	0.0246
REGION__WEST_	0.029799	0.006759	4.408910	0.0000
Y75	0.025368	0.008578	2.957237	0.0032
Y77	0.030562	0.009899	3.087431	0.0021
Y79	0.042255	0.009717	4.348651	0.0000
Y81	0.061296	0.010637	5.762610	0.0000
Y83	0.064805	0.010228	6.335813	0.0000
Y85	0.074130	0.011131	6.659970	0.0000
Y87	0.080503	0.011951	6.735787	0.0000
Y89	0.084565	0.012295	6.877764	0.0000
Y91	0.091458	0.012761	7.167272	0.0000
Y93	0.097853	0.012967	7.546533	0.0000
Y95	0.093678	0.015008	6.241790	0.0000
Y97	0.097206	0.015898	6.114173	0.0000
Y99	0.104041	0.017023	6.111847	0.0000
Y01	0.090380	0.018079	4.999305	0.0000
Y03	0.079101	0.016620	4.759413	0.0000

R-squared	0.658805	Mean dependent var	0.170212
Adjusted R-squared	0.645211	S.D. dependent var	0.090250
S.E. of regression	0.053757	Akaike info criterion	-2.969952
Sum squared resid	2.176022	Schwarz criterion	-2.785517
Log likelihood	1195.221	F-statistic	48.46491
Durbin-Watson stat	2.075035	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 7B
Dependent Variable: DEM_OFDEM
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/16/05 Time: 10:06
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 784
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.067957	0.020614	-3.296562	0.0010
NPORG(-98)	0.012905	0.004876	2.646925	0.0083
DEMORG(-98)	0.059894	0.011415	5.246812	0.0000
REPORG(-98)	0.007738	0.016514	0.468583	0.6395
DEMMARGIN100	-0.000374	9.91E-05	-3.776615	0.0002
TURNOVER	0.000920	0.000237	3.877840	0.0001
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.030242	0.009602	3.149405	0.0017
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.008842	0.001040	8.503965	0.0000
IDEOLOGY(-49)	0.000452	0.000260	1.733895	0.0833
EDUCATION	0.002788	0.000580	4.809126	0.0000
FEMAG(-98)	0.026277	0.013523	1.943162	0.0524
FEMGOV(-98)	0.032513	0.013917	2.336247	0.0197
FEMSEN(-98)	0.033454	0.007715	4.336208	0.0000
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.012492	0.009021	-1.384850	0.1665
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.009954	0.008672	-1.147922	0.2514
REGION__WEST_	0.045776	0.008573	5.339316	0.0000
Y75	0.027844	0.009381	2.967998	0.0031
Y77	0.024711	0.011164	2.213500	0.0272
Y79	0.031535	0.012094	2.607428	0.0093
Y81	0.056119	0.013041	4.303224	0.0000
Y83	0.052457	0.012628	4.154082	0.0000
Y85	0.069477	0.016074	4.322306	0.0000
Y87	0.073573	0.014161	5.195513	0.0000
Y89	0.076952	0.014586	5.275745	0.0000
Y91	0.080756	0.015535	5.198204	0.0000
Y93	0.086723	0.016458	5.269292	0.0000
Y95	0.090027	0.020500	4.391565	0.0000
Y97	0.090257	0.018502	4.878312	0.0000
Y99	0.107380	0.020522	5.232406	0.0000
Y01	0.093134	0.021212	4.390582	0.0000
Y03	0.089158	0.020752	4.296397	0.0000

R-squared	0.670392	Mean dependent var	0.186561
Adjusted R-squared	0.657261	S.D. dependent var	0.116944
S.E. of regression	0.068464	Akaike info criterion	-2.486284
Sum squared resid	3.529537	Schwarz criterion	-2.301849
Log likelihood	1005.623	F-statistic	51.05113
Durbin-Watson stat	2.043207	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000

Table 7C
Dependent Variable: FEM_OFTOTAL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 03/16/05 Time: 10:08
Sample: 99 882
Included observations: 784
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-0.051808	0.015907	-3.256948	0.0012
FUND(-98)	0.002207	0.003598	0.613479	0.5397
TRAIN(-98)	0.014235	0.005057	2.815117	0.0050
DEMMARGIN100	-7.00E-05	7.11E-05	-0.983769	0.3255
TURNOVER	0.000763	0.000185	4.130198	0.0000
LOWPAYLONGSESSION	0.030832	0.009104	3.386637	0.0007
RELATIVE_SEATS	0.004704	0.000954	4.929807	0.0000
IDEOLOGY(-49)	0.000700	0.000190	3.679629	0.0003
EDUCATION	0.002186	0.000467	4.682327	0.0000
FEMAG(-98)	0.019811	0.011932	1.660313	0.0973
FEMGOV(-98)	0.023606	0.011061	2.134143	0.0332
FEMSEN(-98)	0.030325	0.007536	4.024003	0.0001
REGION__SOUTH_	-0.027305	0.006490	-4.206883	0.0000
REGION__NORTHEAST_	-0.010674	0.006709	-1.591088	0.1120
REGION__WEST_	0.031110	0.006610	4.706567	0.0000
Y75	0.025394	0.008524	2.979058	0.0030
Y77	0.031698	0.009520	3.329608	0.0009
Y79	0.042618	0.009476	4.497740	0.0000
Y81	0.061404	0.010282	5.972223	0.0000
Y83	0.064941	0.009908	6.554451	0.0000
Y85	0.074169	0.010769	6.887108	0.0000
Y87	0.080305	0.011827	6.789952	0.0000
Y89	0.084457	0.012123	6.966423	0.0000
Y91	0.091511	0.012462	7.342969	0.0000
Y93	0.098434	0.012887	7.638078	0.0000
Y95	0.094623	0.014785	6.399876	0.0000
Y97	0.099733	0.015465	6.448934	0.0000
Y99	0.105516	0.016395	6.435774	0.0000
Y01	0.092870	0.017477	5.313853	0.0000
Y03	0.080690	0.016442	4.907692	0.0000

R-squared	0.658491	Mean dependent var	0.170212
Adjusted R-squared	0.645356	S.D. dependent var	0.090250
S.E. of regression	0.053746	Akaike info criterion	-2.971585
Sum squared resid	2.178021	Schwarz criterion	-2.793100
Log likelihood	1194.861	F-statistic	50.13278
Durbin-Watson stat	2.078530	Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000